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Agenda item 34
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 25 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, dated 25 February 2014, in reaction to the illegal activities of Russian occupation troops along the administrative boundary line of Georgia's occupied Tskhinvali region (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kaha **Imnadze**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 25 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia in reaction to the illegal activities of Russian occupation troops along the administrative boundary line of Georgia's occupied Tskhinvali region

[Tbilisi, 25 February 2014]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia is deeply concerned by the resumption of the illegal activities of Russian occupation forces along the occupation line in the Tskhinvali region of Georgia. In the last few days, the Russian occupation troops have resumed the erection of barbed wire fences in areas close to the villages of Ghogheti and Atotsi (Kareli district). It needs to be considered that the installation of such fences in the occupied Tskhinvali region had been suspended for the past two weeks.

Regrettably, and despite numerous calls by the international community, the Russian Federation is continuing to violate the fundamental principles of international law as well as the commitments it undertook under the 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia strictly condemns Russia's illegal actions, which have a negative impact on the humanitarian situation of the local population and significantly restrict their internationally recognized rights, including the right to free movement, to education in their native language, and other economic, cultural and social rights. Unfortunately, the local population has been prevented from carrying out agricultural work and gaining access to cemeteries and emergency medical services.

The critical nature of the situation in Georgia's occupied regions and adjacent areas once again underlines the importance of the need to establish international mechanisms for monitoring security and human rights therein.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia calls upon the international community to adequately assess the current situation in Georgia's occupied territories, and to undertake effective measures to put a stop to Russia's illegal activities.

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

Reporting period from 14 November 2013 to 27 February 2014

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my previous report of 13 November 2013 (S/2013/650).

2. In the midst of Lebanon's protracted political process and deteriorating security situation, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) area of operations remained relatively stable notwithstanding two serious incidents, both of them breaches of the cessation of hostilities and violations of resolution 1701 (2006). On 15 December, one Israel Defense Forces soldier was killed by a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier shooting across the Blue Line in an individual act. On 29 December, rockets launched from southern Lebanon against Israel were met with artillery response by the Israel Defense Forces without causing any injuries or damage. The incidents were contained through the enhanced utilization by the parties of the liaison and coordination arrangements established with UNIFIL. Lebanon and Israel continued to display their resolve to safeguard the quiet along the Blue Line and their commitment to resolution 1701 (2006), although their respective outstanding obligations under the resolution remain pending.

3. There was a worrying upsurge in terrorist incidents related to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period. Al-Qaeda-linked armed groups claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in Lebanon, including a double suicide bombing of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Beirut on 19 November. As at 5 February, there were a further six suicide bombings in Beirut and Hermel, in which a total of 15 people were killed. On 27 December, former Minister Mohammed Chattah was assassinated in a car bomb attack, which also killed five other people. On 16 January, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon opened the in absentia trial of the persons accused in connection with the 2005 killing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

4. Cross-border shelling and shooting from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon continued, causing at least seven fatalities, injuries and material damage. There were also at least five air strikes by Syrian Government aircraft, as well as helicopter air strikes in which two Lebanese citizens reportedly were killed. The

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Lebanese Armed Forces reported continued smuggling of weapons across the Lebanese-Syrian border.

5. Ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic led to a continued influx of Syrians seeking shelter in Lebanon. As at 3 February 2014, there were 902,000 Syrian refugees assisted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and partners, an increase of approximately 100,000 since my previous report.

6. On 15 February, following extensive dialogue across the political spectrum, Prime Minister designate Tammam Salam announced the formation of a 24-member Government of national interest, 11 months after the resignation of Prime Minister Mikati's Government. In accordance with Lebanese law, the period set for parliamentary sessions to choose a new President starts on 25 March 2014, ahead of the end of President Sleiman's term of office on 25 May 2014.

7. The International Support Group for Lebanon met in New York on 25 November, and members have continued to coordinate to mobilize support for Lebanon. On 15 December, a multi-donor trust fund was established by the World Bank in support of Lebanon's stabilization efforts. On 29 December, President Sleiman announced that Saudi Arabia would provide $3 billion to be used to purchase military equipment for the Lebanese Armed Forces from France.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

8. In the evening of 15 December, an Israel Defense Forces officer was shot across the Blue Line by a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier in the vicinity of Ras Al-Naqoura (Sector West) and died from his injuries before reaching the hospital. In the ensuing hours, the Israel Defense Forces fired gunshots and flares towards Lebanon in the same general area, without causing personal injuries or material damage, before ceasing fire later in the night.

9. Upon being alerted about the incident by the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL immediately engaged with both sides, urging them to exercise restraint, requesting their cooperation, and keeping communication channels open to avert further escalation of the situation. The Lebanese Armed Forces at the highest level assured UNIFIL of its full commitment to the cessation of hostilities and explained that the shooting was an isolated incident perpetrated by a lone soldier. In the morning after the shooting, the Lebanese Armed Forces found and arrested the soldier, who had fled, and opened an investigation, as did UNIFIL. UNIFIL called an extraordinary tripartite meeting on 16 December at the request of the Israel Defense Forces.

10. The 16 December extraordinary tripartite meeting facilitated by UNIFIL sought to preserve confidence among the parties in order to fully restore the cessation of hostilities along the Blue Line, establish the facts and circumstances of the incident, and strengthen the existing security arrangements to prevent any such incidents from reoccurring. The presence of my Special Coordinator at the meeting attested to the particular concern of the United Nations. The Lebanese Armed Forces

expressed regret for the incident, which it reiterated was an isolated individual act, and said that the soldier involved would be held accountable under Lebanese law.

11. Cooperation by the parties allowed UNIFIL to complete its investigation quickly, which included two interviews of the perpetrator facilitated by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The UNIFIL investigation found that the soldier had acted alone without provocation or orders, and in contravention of the rules of engagement of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in a serious violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The firing at Lebanon across the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces was also in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). As a result of the investigation by the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Prosecutor for the Military Tribunal issued an indictment including charges of a serious offence on 29 January and directed the case to the Investigative Judge.

12. In a second serious incident, on 29 December, a rocket was launched against Israel from the El Khraibe area of Lebanon, in the UNIFIL area of operations (Sector East). Unknown assailants fired four rockets, one impacting Israel near Kiryat Shmona, two falling short of the Blue Line, and one, which misfired, falling a short distance from the launch. In retaliation for the attack, the Israel Defense Forces fired 33 artillery rounds across the Blue Line towards the launching area in Lebanon. No injury or material damage was caused by either the rocket attack or the Israeli response.

13. Immediately after the incident, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander was in contact with his Israel Defense Forces and Lebanese Armed Forces counterparts to defuse the situation and prevent any further escalation. For the first time, UNIFIL communicated with the parties via a simultaneous videoconference link, the latest enhancement of the tripartite liaison apparatus.

14. UNIFIL began an investigation to determine the facts and circumstances of the rocket attack and inspected the launch sites and those impacted by the Israel Defense Forces artillery fire in Lebanon, as well as the rocket impact sites in Israel and Lebanon. UNIFIL intensified its patrols across the area of operations and focused its coordinated operations with the Lebanese Armed Forces on potential rocket launching sites, with a view to preventing any further attacks.

15. The Lebanese Armed Forces shared the results of its own investigation with UNIFIL, stating that the rockets had been launched using crude improvised launching pads and an electrical timer. At least two perpetrators were involved; they used a vehicle to carry the rockets in the early hours of the morning by secondary unpaved roads to avoid detection. Both parties told UNIFIL that they attributed the rocket firing to an extremist group aiming to cause general destabilization in the area. The attack has not been claimed to date.

16. At the 29 January tripartite meeting, UNIFIL recommended that the Lebanese Armed Forces, with the support of the Mission, further enhance security control over the area of operations to ensure that it is free of unauthorized armed elements, that the Lebanese authorities find the perpetrators of incidents and bring them to justice, and that both parties do the maximum to avoid escalation and to decrease tensions.

17. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces maintained the same level of coordinated activities as during the previous reporting period, manning 10 permanent co-located checkpoints, 7 in Sector East and 3 in Sector West. In addition, UNIFIL

conducted training for the Lebanese Armed Forces with the aim of improving the effectiveness of combined operations as well as Lebanese Armed Forces tactical and operational capabilities. There was no notable change in the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces south of the Litani River, which remained at approximately two brigades.

18. UNIFIL observed a number of ground violations of the Blue Line committed mainly by Lebanese shepherds but also by farmers. Most ground violations were brief and took place in the Shab'a Farms area (Sector East). In addition, two men on 20 November and three boys on 11 January violated the Blue Line while fishing in the Wazzani River. UNIFIL protested the violations to the Lebanese Armed Forces, recalling that it is the primary responsibility of the Lebanese authorities to ensure full respect for the Blue Line in its entirety.

19. Also in the Shab'a Farms area, on 5 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces detained a man crossing the Blue Line into Lebanon. The man told the Lebanese Armed Forces that he was from the Syrian Arab Republic and was trying to join his parents who were refugees in Lebanon. On 13 January, a foreign domestic worker employed in Lebanon crossed the Blue Line into Israel and was detained by the Israel Defense Forces. Subsequently, her case was handled by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Israeli Ministry of the Interior.

20. The Israel Defense Forces also violated the Blue Line once, on 15 January, when eight Israeli soldiers briefly crossed the Blue Line while patrolling in the vicinity of Meiss ej-Jebel. UNIFIL protested the violation to the Israel Defense Forces, who denied the violation.

21. There was no change in the status of the Israeli-occupied northern part of the village of Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line, which remains a violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. Israel is yet to respond to the UNIFIL proposal regarding security arrangements aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the area, submitted to both parties on 25 June 2011. The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL of its approval on 19 July 2011. UNIFIL continued to raise the issue with the Israeli authorities, who did not provide any new information.

22. Air violations, mostly by unmanned aerial vehicles, but also by fixed-wing aircraft, including fighter jets, continued almost daily in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. UNIFIL protested all violations to the Israel Defense Forces, calling upon the authorities to cease them immediately. The Government of Lebanon also protested the violations. In a 19 November letter to UNIFIL, Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Lieutenant-General Kahwaji expressed deep concern regarding the continued violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israel Air Force, including reconnaissance and training flights conducted over the northern and eastern parts of the country. The Israeli authorities have denied conducting air training activities over Lebanon and continue to claim that the reconnaissance overflights are necessary security measures.

23. In addition to the 15 and 29 December incidents described above, there were several instances of tension across the Blue Line. The most serious occurred on 18 January, when UNIFIL observed a suspicious object close to the Blue Line in the vicinity of El Adeisse (Sector East). After UNIFIL secured the area and informed the parties of its discovery, an initial deployment of Israeli and Lebanese troops on both

sides of the Blue Line resulted in a tense stand-off. UNIFIL Geographic Information System (GIS) measurements determined that the object was located a few metres south of the Blue Line. Through the UNIFIL videoconference links, the Head of Mission and Force Commander opened a dialogue with the parties and was able to defuse the tension. Thereafter, the Israel Defense Forces removed the object.

24. On several occasions during the period, the Israel Defense Forces carried out maintenance work between the technical fence and the Blue Line and, in some cases, Israeli and Lebanese soldiers pointed their weapons at each other. UNIFIL troops on the ground defused the situation. On 24 December, a bush fire on the northern side of the Blue Line at B19 in the vicinity of Yarin (Sector West) triggered some explosions in a mine field. The Lebanese Armed Forces protested to UNIFIL, claiming that the Israel Defense Forces had ignited the fire. UNIFIL investigations could not substantiate the Lebanese claim and found no violation of the Blue Line.

25. UNIFIL generally enjoyed full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations. However, during the reporting period, UNIFIL troops encountered five cases of unfriendly behaviour by civilians, some involving aggressive conduct towards peacekeepers and, in one instance, theft of UNIFIL equipment. On 4 December, a UNIFIL patrol was diverted while passing through the village of Yatar (Sector West) and channelled into a constricted area where its movement was stopped by a group of approximately 20 young men. As the patrol commander dismounted the vehicle to approach the group, they pushed him aside and forcefully entered the vehicles, quickly removing some communication equipment and a map. The Lebanese Armed Forces then arrived on the scene and escorted UNIFIL back to its position. On 10 December, a UNIFIL patrol with six peacekeepers and two light vehicles was stopped in Blida (Sector East) by approximately 15 civilians. After a member of the patrol stepped out of his vehicle in an attempt to speak with the group, the group tried to remove his personal weapon, which he avoided by getting back into his vehicle. The civilians then slashed six tires of the patrol vehicles. On 16 January, civilians in a vehicle in the vicinity of El Adeisse approached UNIFIL troops and accused them of taking their photographs, demanding that they hand over their equipment. To avoid escalation, the UNIFIL troops handed over a memory card. On 23 January, in the vicinity of Hanin (Sector West), a civilian car overtook a UNIFIL patrol and stopped a short distance ahead, signalling the patrol for assistance. As UNIFIL soldiers proceeded to assist the driver, some civilians arrived on motorized scooters, surrounded the patrol and threw large rocks, causing damage to UNIFIL vehicles but no injuries.

26. UNIFIL protested all the incidents to the Lebanese authorities, impressing upon them the importance of the full freedom of movement of UNIFIL. Where required, the Lebanese Armed Forces intervened to bring a quick end to the incidents.

27. These incidents notwithstanding, UNIFIL relations with the local population remained generally positive, as supported by regular meetings and liaison activities with communities. Specific initiatives were carried out in villages that had seen incidents of unfriendly behaviour in the past. In Blida, for instance, road signs were erected in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, to help to direct UNIFIL vehicular traffic along the main roads and avoid friction with the inhabitants.

28. UNIFIL implemented quick-impact projects in support of its mandate and participated in joint outreach activities with a wide range of United Nations

agencies and non-governmental and other organizations. UNIFIL continued to brief newly deployed contingents on the local environment, including vis-à-vis the Syrian refugees present in the area of operations. In cooperation with the international non-governmental organization Save the Children, UNFIL organized training for the mission's military personnel, with a view to raising their awareness of child protection. UNIFIL troops directly provided medical, dental and veterinary assistance and implemented projects in the areas of water and sanitation, education and environmental protection.

29. During the period, UNIFIL observed a number of individuals carrying hunting weapons south of the Litani River, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). Most of the instances were observed in the areas of Bastara, Houla and Meiss ej-Jebel. In each case, UNIFIL tried to halt the hunting activity and notified the Lebanese Armed Forces of the violations.

30. UNIFIL continued to provide assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps to establish an area free of armed personnel, assets and weapons between the Blue Line and the Litani River, other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL. Incidents during the reporting period demonstrated that unauthorized weapons and hostile armed elements ready to use them were still present in the area of operations.

31. The Government of Israel continued to allege that Hizbullah had been building up its military presence inside populated areas in southern Lebanon and that unauthorized weapons were being transferred into Lebanon, including into the UNIFIL area of operations. If specific information is received regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons in its area of operations, UNIFIL, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, remains determined to act with all means available within its mandate and to the full extent provided for in its rules of engagement. In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL does not proactively search for weapons in the south. As described in my previous reports, UNIFIL cannot enter private property unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from that specific location. To date, UNIFIL has neither been provided with, nor found, evidence of the unauthorized transfer of arms into its area of operations. The Lebanese Armed Forces Command continued to state that it would act immediately to put a stop to any activity in contravention of resolution 1701 (2006) and relevant Government decisions.

32. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continued to carry out its dual mandate of conducting maritime interdiction operations and training the Lebanese Armed Forces. Since my previous report, the Task Force hailed 1,526 ships, and the Lebanese navy and Customs officials inspected 422 vessels to verify that there were no unauthorized arms or related materiel on board. In addition, the Task Force conducted 90 training activities with the Lebanese navy.

33. Along the line of buoys, UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces patrol boats dropping eight depth charges and three flares, reportedly to ward off Lebanese fishing boats in the vicinity. Israel conducted two gunnery exercises in the vicinity of the line of buoys on the Israeli side, and maintenance on several buoys. UNIFIL has no mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which the Government of Israel installed unilaterally and which the Government of Lebanon does not recognize.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

34. The liaison and coordination arrangements between UNIFIL and the parties continued to serve as the foundation of the mission's work in implementing resolution 1701 (2006), safeguarding the cessation of hostilities, ensuring full respect for the Blue Line, and protecting security and stability in southern Lebanon. In that regard, the parties continued to engage constructively with UNIFIL, both at the tripartite and bilateral levels.

35. The tripartite forum chaired by the UNIFIL Force Commander remained the key mechanism for addressing all security and military operational issues related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). During the reporting period, three tripartite meetings were held, on 4 and 16 December and 29 January.

36. Liaison and coordination arrangements were enhanced in the wake of the rocket launching on 29 December, with a simultaneous videoconferencing link between UNIFIL and the parties. This link should enable real-time exchange in the aftermath of a serious incident and assist UNIFIL in de-escalating tensions. Meanwhile, there was no progress in establishing a UNIFIL office in Tel Aviv.

37. On 9 January, the Government of Lebanon transmitted a complaint to the Security Council accusing the Government of Israel of waging an electronic war on Lebanon and its information and communication networks. The Lebanese Armed Forces also requested UNIFIL to take all possible measures to stop this Israeli aggression and to include telecommunications violations on the regular agenda of the tripartite meetings.

38. UNIFIL also continued to work with the parties to establish visible markers along the Blue Line. As at 29 January, UNIFIL had cleared 300 points from mines, measured 230 points, constructed 203 points and verified 182 points.

39. As part of its strategic priorities, and in complement to the efforts of the International Support Group to bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNIFIL continued its work to facilitate the army's capacity-building for tasks mandated under resolution 1701 (2006) and focused on the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line. The Strategic Dialogue Permanent Committee, composed of representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Government of Lebanon (Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), UNIFIL and the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, met on 17 January and reviewed the scope, purpose and objectives of the strategic dialogue, in the context of the initiatives arising from the International Support Group, the recent donation pledged by Saudi Arabia, and the army's five-year development plan, of which the strategic dialogue is an integral part.

C. Disarming armed groups

40. Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) called for the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon.

41. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the Lebanese State, in violation of resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701

(2006), continues to restrict the State's ability to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains a substantial military capacity separate from that of the Lebanese State, which it claims serves as a deterrent against potential aggression from Israel. The Government of Israel asserts that these weapons, including large quantities of missiles, constitute a serious threat. President Sleiman has continued to advocate the approach to the control of Hizbullah's arms contained in the national defence strategy paper that he presented as a basis for discussion in the National Dialogue in September 2012. No meetings of the National Dialogue were held during this reporting period.

42. Arms outside the control of the State continued to proliferate and undermine stability inside Lebanon. During the reporting period, there were repeated violent incidents, including terrorist bombings, assassinations and attacks on the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 19 November, a double suicide bombing in the Bir al-Abed neighbourhood of Beirut targeted the Iranian Embassy, killing at least 23 people and injuring more than 140. On 4 December, Hassan Laqis, a Hizbullah commander, was assassinated in Beirut. On 15 December, there were two attacks on Lebanese army checkpoints in Sidon, which killed one soldier and five of the purported attackers. On 17 December, a car bomb exploded in the Beqaa valley near a point reported to be a Hizbullah training camp and reportedly caused two fatalities. On 27 December, former Minister Mohammed Chattah, a senior adviser to former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, was assassinated by a car bomb in Beirut, which also killed five other people. A suicide bombing in the Beirut suburb of Haret Hraik killed 5 people and injured 77 on 2 January. In the Beqaa valley town of Hermel, 3 people were killed and 26 injured in a 16 January car bomb. On 21 January, another suicide bombing in Haret Hraik killed 4 people and injured 35. On 1 February, a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb in Hermel, killing three, and on 3 February a suicide attack in Choueifat in south Beirut killed the suicide bomber and wounded two people. The Al-Qaeda-linked groups Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham have variously claimed responsibility for some of these attacks.

43. In Tripoli, there was recurrent violence during the reporting period between the predominantly Sunni neighbourhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the neighbouring Alawite area of Jabel Mohsen. Clashes on 30 November resulted in 12 fatalities, including one Lebanese soldier, and over 70 injuries. On 2 December, caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced that the Lebanese Armed Forces would assume control of security in Tripoli and that security services in the city would be reinforced and put under their command. One Lebanese soldier was subsequently killed and six others injured on 5 December during patrols to secure the city. Members of the Alawite community were targeted by gunmen in a number of attacks, including on 11 December when two Alawite men were shot and seriously wounded by unknown gunmen. Outbreaks of violence in Tripoli during January led to at least seven fatalities, including one Lebanese soldier, and over 48 casualties, including at least five Lebanese soldiers.

44. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to deploy across the country to prevent attacks, contain violence and confront and detain armed elements. The Lebanese Armed Forces defused car bombs, including in the Bekaa valley on 22 November and in Zahle on 29 November. On 22 December, the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in the Bekaa town of Souairi to contain an armed clash between two families that had caused four fatalities. On 30 December, it was reported that Majed

al-Majed, the commander of the extremist Abdallah Azzam Brigades, which had claimed responsibility for, inter alia, the Iranian Embassy bombing, was seriously ill and in the custody of Army Intelligence. Al-Majed died in custody on 4 January. The Lebanese Armed Forces confronted other militants from the Abdullah Azzam Brigades and military prosecutors charged suspects with membership in the organization. On 22 January, Omar Atrash, a Sunni militant wanted in connection with recent attacks was arrested. On 12 February, Naim Abbas, reportedly a senior leader of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades was arrested, and two car bombs were discovered and dismantled. Military magistrates have sentenced a number of those accused of responsibility for car bombs, including sentencing to death nine suspects on 3 December for their involvement in a failed plot to bomb the southern suburb of Maamoura in October.

45. There has been no progress on the dismantling of military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada. In 2006, it was decided in the National Dialogue that these bases should be dismantled. Their existence continues to compromise Lebanese sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to monitor and control effectively parts of the Lebanese-Syrian border.

46. The Palestinian refugee camp of Ein el-Helweh and the neighbouring Taamir area have been used as a refuge by militant Sunni elements, allegedly including fugitive Ahmed Assir. On 1 December, militants from the Jund al-Sham group killed a member of Fatah and injured two others. In violence over the next two days, two others were injured. On 25 December, a car bomb exploded in Ein el-Helweh without causing casualties. On 1 February, one individual with links to Fatah was killed by two unidentified gunmen in Ein el-Helweh.

D. Arms embargo and border control

47. In its resolution 1701 (2006), the Security Council decided that all States should prevent the sale or the supply of arms and related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft. It also called upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry into Lebanon without its consent of arms and related materiel.

48. Representatives of the Government of Israel have consistently alleged that there are significant, ongoing arms transfers to Hizbullah across the Lebanese-Syrian border. The United Nations takes these allegations seriously but is not in a position to independently verify them. Representatives of the Government of Israel have continued to express grave concern at the prospect of the transfer of advanced weapons systems to Hizbullah. Hizbullah has denied allegations that chemical weapons have been transferred to it and maintains that it does not intend to acquire them.

49. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployed in border areas to counter the movement of armed elements between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. In multiple incidents in December and January, Lebanese soldiers arrested Syrians near the border with the Syrian Arab Republic, some of whom were in possession of arms. On 21 December, there was a report of a number of casualties as a result of fighting near the Bekaa valley village of Nahle, apparently between Hizbullah

fighters and armed members of the Syrian opposition. On 30 January, the Lebanese Armed Forces intercepted a vehicle loaded with arms as it crossed from the Syrian Arab Republic and attempted to enter the Bekaa town of Arsal.

50. During the reporting period, there were repeated incidents of shooting, cross-border shelling and rockets fired into Lebanon from the Syrian Arab Republic, causing a number of injuries and material damage. On 17 January, rockets struck the border town of Arsal, killing seven people and injuring seven others. On 31 January, one Lebanese citizen was killed and several injured in Akkar by shelling from within the Syrian Arab Republic. There were also at least five air strikes within Lebanon by a Syrian Government aircraft and helicopters, in which two Lebanese citizens were reportedly killed. Following statements by the Lebanese authorities of their intention to defend Lebanon from violations of its sovereignty, the Lebanese Armed Forces fired back at Syrian aircraft in Lebanese airspace on 30 December.

51. Hizbullah publicly acknowledged its continued involvement in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic and held funerals for Hizbullah fighters killed there. Other Lebanese elements are reported to be engaged in fighting alongside the Syrian opposition. President Sleiman has continued to call upon all parties to adhere to the policy of disassociation agreed in the Baabda Declaration during the National Dialogue session of June 2012.

52. The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon has continued to grow. As at 15 February, 927,000 Syrians had registered or were seeking registration with UNHCR, almost 80 per cent of whom are women and children. This includes 42,900 registered refugees in the UNIFIL area of operations. Additionally, 52,000 Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic have sought refuge in Lebanon but since August 2013, they have faced restrictions on entering Lebanon. On 16 December, the United Nations launched the sixth Syria Regional Response Plan, appealing for $1.7 billion for Lebanon, including an appeal for $165 million presented by the Government. This appeal covers humanitarian needs for a projected 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 100,000 Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, 50,000 Lebanese returnees and 1.5 million affected Lebanese through the end of 2014. Funding for the fifth Regional Response Plan (2013) reached 51 per cent of its $1.6 billion goal. Many refugees continue to live in substandard accommodation and lack access to basic services, including clean water and sanitation. Provision of adequate shelter remains a particular challenge given the dispersal of refugees in over 1,600 localities throughout Lebanon.

53. Humanitarian partners continued implementing their winterization programme to mitigate the additional challenges posed by colder temperatures. United Nations agencies are also scaling up their interventions to extend additional support for host communities. To guide the national response and mitigate the socioeconomic and humanitarian impact on Lebanon, the World Bank, the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon jointly produced the Road map of Priority Interventions for Stabilization from the Syrian Conflict, presented by the Government at the Second International Humanitarian Pledging Conference for Syria, held in Kuwait City. The multi-donor trust fund referred to in paragraph 7 above was established as an additional option for channelling assistance.

54. The situation for Syrian refugee women and girls in Lebanon, as elsewhere, remains particularly difficult. Coping mechanisms for survival include prostitution, sex offered in return for assistance and early marriage of girls. Further protection

and support mechanisms are needed to combat reported sexual exploitation, physical abuse and harassment.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

55. Eight manual mine clearance teams, two explosive ordnance disposal teams and one mechanical mine clearance team from UNIFIL were validated by the United Nations Mine Action Support Team and deployed in the UNIFIL area of operations during the reporting period. UNIFIL cleared more than 1,656 m^2 of hazardous land to provide access to Blue Line points and found and destroyed 66 anti-personnel mines during the period from 1 November to 2 February. Furthermore, the Team conducted 27 validation events, 84 quality assurance visits of operational sites and 82 visits, meetings and demonstrations. It also provided explosive ordnance awareness training to 15 members of Observer Group Lebanon and 11 UNIFIL staff members as part of the course "Safe and secure approach to field environments".

56. The Lebanese Mine Action Centre reported that, during the period from 1 November to 31 January, it had cleared 559,334 m^2 of hazardous land, including minefields and battle areas, and destroyed 709 cluster munition items, 210 unexploded ordnance and eight anti-personnel mines.

F. Delineation of borders

57. No progress was made during the reporting period towards the delineation or demarcation of the Lebanese-Syrian border, including in areas where it is uncertain or disputed, as called for in Security Council resolutions 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006). Extending the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout all Lebanese territory and enabling the Lebanese security forces and Lebanese Armed Forces to secure borders to prevent the entry of arms or related materiel necessitates the delineation and demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic as soon as practicable.

58. There has also been no progress on the issue of the Shab'a Farms. There has still been no reaction to the provisional definition of that area contained in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641) from either Israel or the Syrian Arab Republic.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

59. UNIFIL continued to cooperate closely with the Lebanese authorities to ensure the safety and security of all Mission personnel, in addition to applying its own risk mitigation measures, continuously reviewing its security plan and carrying out safety awareness training for its personnel.

60. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in the Lebanese Military Court against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers. In two cases of serious attacks in 2008 pending at the Military Court of Appeal and the Permanent Court of first instance respectively, hearings were scheduled for 27 March and 2 May. In two cases of serious attacks

perpetrated in 2007 and 2011, the investigations have not identified the suspected perpetrators as yet and both cases remain open pending new evidence. The investigation is still ongoing in two other cases of serious attacks perpetrated in 2011. A new investigation was launched following the arrest on 20 January of a person suspected of preparing terrorist attacks against UNIFIL.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

61. As at 27 January, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 10,113, including 365 women. The civilian component consisted of 301 international and 634 national staff, including 90 and 160 women, respectively. A total of 52 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization military observers, including two women, are also part of UNIFIL.

62. In November, the Irish-Finnish battalion completed its rotation; it is now composed of two Finnish companies and one Irish company. In January, the Malaysian battalion completed its redeployment from Sector East to Sector West.

63. As at 27 January, the Maritime Task Force consisted of three frigates, four fast patrol boats and two helicopters.

V. Observations

64. Despite the serious incidents and provocations during the reporting period, relative stability has been maintained in southern Lebanon and along the Blue Line. This is notable given the situation elsewhere in Lebanon and in the region. Sustaining this calm is important in maintaining the fragile stability in Lebanon and for regional security. I commend the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces for their resolve in safeguarding the cessation of hostilities through the utilization of the presence of UNIFIL, particularly its liaison and coordination arrangements. I am also encouraged by the parties' continued willingness to engage with UNIFIL on constructive confidence-building measures. The number of recent incidents across Lebanon further underlines the imperative for the parties to continue to prevent any escalatory developments along the Blue Line.

65. I remain concerned at the lack of progress towards achieving a permanent ceasefire to the conflict, as envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006). My Special Coordinator and UNIFIL have continued to emphasize the need for the parties to work towards that goal by taking tangible steps and laying the groundwork for future progress. I continue to encourage the parties to recommit to a permanent ceasefire and to work with my Special Coordinator and UNIFIL to achieve that aim.

66. I regret the tragic killing of a soldier of the Israel Defense Forces on 15 December. This deplorable act by a Lebanese Armed Forces soldier could have led to a major escalation, were it not for the collective efforts of UNIFIL and the parties.

67. I condemn the firing of rockets on 29 December. Such hostile actions, in serious breach of resolution 1701 (2006) and of the cessation of hostilities, gravely endanger human lives and threaten to unravel peace and security in the area. The Lebanese authorities have the primary responsibility to ensure that there are no

unauthorized armed personnel, assets or weapons in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River and to prevent any attempts to use Lebanese territory for hostile actions. Notwithstanding every country's right to self-defence, retaliatory fire by Israel does not conform to United Nations expectations with respect to the cessation of hostilities. These expectations include that each party immediately notify UNIFIL if it has been fired upon and refrain from responding, except where clearly required in immediate self-defence. This would allow UNIFIL in the first instance to effectively deal with the attack by coordinating an immediate security and investigative response.

68. Major obligations under the resolution remain outstanding and require action by both parties. The imperative to remove unauthorized weapons from the UNIFIL area of operations remains a long-term endeavour with added urgency in the light of the increasingly fragile stability in Lebanon.

69. In addition, I remain concerned that overflights of Lebanese territory and territorial waters continue to be committed almost daily by Israel in violation of Lebanese sovereignty and of resolution 1701 (2006). I call again upon the Government of Israel to cease all violations of Lebanese airspace.

70. The continued occupation by the Israel Defense Forces of the northern part of the village of Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line constitutes a continuing violation of resolution 1701 (2006). Israel has an obligation to withdraw its armed forces from northern Ghajar, in accordance with the resolution.

71. I welcome the continued progress in the visible marking of the Blue Line, which has contributed to preventing inadvertent ground violations. The commitment of the parties to continue working with UNIFIL, including on contentious or problematic points, will be vital to the completion of this process. Notwithstanding their respective reservations, both sides have undertaken to respect the Blue Line, as identified by the United Nations, in its entirety.

72. I remain concerned that incidents that impede the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and endanger the safety and security of peacekeepers continue to occur. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL and the security and safety of its personnel are integral to the effective execution of its tasks, in accordance with resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1773 (2007). The primary responsibility for ensuring the freedom of movement of UNIFIL in its area of operations lies with the Lebanese authorities.

73. Lebanon continues to be affected adversely by the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. I deplore the shelling, shooting and aerial incursions into Lebanese border areas from the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as the movement of armed fighters and war materiel between the two countries. The lack of progress in delineating and demarcating the border between the two countries is no justification for violations of Lebanese sovereignty by any party. I call upon the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and all parties fighting there to cease violations of the border and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006) and 1701 (2006).

74. I condemn the participation of Lebanese citizens in the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic in breach of the policies of neutrality and disassociation adopted by the Government of Lebanon and of the principles of the Baabda Declaration of June 2012, which was agreed upon by all of Lebanon's political leaders. I call upon all Lebanese parties to step back from any involvement in the Syrian conflict,

consistent with their commitment in the Baabda Declaration, and urge them instead to act in the interests of Lebanon and to recommit to the policy of disassociation.

75. The Security Council strongly condemned the numerous terrorist acts in Lebanon during the reporting period, which cost many lives and caused great suffering to many innocent Lebanese. This is a new and dangerous dimension in the present crisis. The terrorist groups perpetrating these acts threaten the security of all Lebanese people. I reiterate my call for unity on the part of all parties in Lebanon in the face of such threat. I call upon all the Lebanese people to stand behind their State institutions, including the army and security forces, as the best means to confront such unacceptable and indiscriminate actions. The recurrent rounds of violence in Tripoli remain of deep concern. Violence and attacks against the Lebanese Armed Forces in that city and elsewhere reflect the unacceptable proliferation of weapons outside the authority of the State. In that regard, I call upon Member States to uphold their obligation under resolution 1701 (2006) to prevent the sale or supply of arms or related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon. Continued broad political support is needed for the security and judicial authorities to combat impunity in respect of all acts of violence. The assassination of former Minister Mohammed Chattah was a deeply disturbing reminder of earlier crimes. The opening of the trial in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon illustrates the refusal of Lebanon and the international community to acquiesce in impunity.

76. The maintenance of arms by Hizbullah and other groups outside the control of the State continues to pose a threat to Lebanese sovereignty and stability and contradicts the country's obligations under resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). President Sleiman has reiterated the urgency of the adoption of a national defence strategy in the light of the use of Hizbullah's arms outside Lebanon. I urge the parties to resume the National Dialogue to address the issue of arms. A return to the Dialogue could be useful in addressing other issues as well, including building upon the Baabda Declaration. I commend President Sleiman for his leadership in taking forward this and other crucial dossiers. With the approach of the end of his term of office, the principles agreed in the Baabda Declaration received further support in the National Charter of the Maronite Patriarchate, published on 9 February. I further reiterate my call for the implementation of earlier decisions of the National Dialogue, specifically those relating to the disarmament of the non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

77. I warmly welcome the formation of the new Government of Lebanon and commend Prime Minister Tammam Salam for the efforts to bring about an inclusive outcome. I urge Lebanon's political leaders to build on their constructive engagement in order to sustain and build up the vital institutions of the State in the face of continuing adversity. It is of crucial importance for confidence and stability that the presidential election be conducted successfully within the legal and constitutional time frame. Equally important is the need to take steps to ensure that parliamentary elections are held thereafter without delay and in accordance with the Constitution. I pay tribute to outgoing Prime Minister Najib Mikati for his leadership. Given the severity of the security, humanitarian and economic challenges facing Lebanon, it is essential for the Government to be able to act effectively without delay to address such challenges with the full support of all parties. Such cooperation is also essential for the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and other relevant resolutions, as well as

for the continued commitment to the Baabda Declaration, which remain crucial to Lebanon's stability.

78. The international community has reason to be grateful for the continued open border policy of Lebanon and its generous efforts in hosting and assisting Syrian refugees. Lebanon hosts the largest number of refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic in both absolute terms and relative to population. The burden of such a large number of refugees, proportionally greater than in any other country in the world, on so small and fragile a State is huge. It drains its resources and has severe impacts on stability. I commend the response by the Government of Lebanon, including during the sudden refugee influx into the town of Arsal in November. Whatever Government is in place in the coming period, it is crucial that it have strong mechanisms in place to coordinate, in partnership with the United Nations, both the refugee response and support for host communities. However, this is a burden that must be shared. I am grateful to all the donors who have contributed to the appeals for Syrian refugees in Lebanon to date. While I am encouraged by the additional commitments made at the pledging conference I chaired in Kuwait in January, the shortfall in 2013 — and potentially in 2014 — was very large. Early delivery on pledges made is crucial for the sake of the refugees. More assistance will be needed in the coming months. Additionally, given the acute pressures on government services, local administration and host communities, it is vital that programmes envisaged in the road map for stabilization presented by the Government be funded, including through the multi-donor trust fund that has now been established. Lastly, it is encouraging that a number of Member States have opened their door to at least a measure of resettlement: programmes of this sort are important both for securing assistance to the most vulnerable and as a signal to neighbouring countries such as Lebanon of the international community's commitment to burden-sharing.

79. I commend the Lebanese Armed Forces for its continued commitment and strong cooperation with UNIFIL and for the role that it plays in upholding Lebanese commitments under resolution 1701 (2006). In addition to playing a key role in the preservation of stability along the Blue Line, the Lebanese Armed Forces addressed the multiple threats to Lebanon's security and stability in other parts of the country. This included efforts to secure the areas bordering the Syrian Arab Republic and to combat terrorism and maintain stability in Lebanon against the daunting challenges posed by the impact of the Syrian crisis. My Special Coordinator and UNIFIL have worked with the Lebanese Armed Forces to finalize coordination mechanisms to facilitate additional donor support in response to the five-year capabilities development programme and to the strategic dialogue plan, which seeks to support the gradual assumption by the Lebanese Armed Forces of security control in the UNIFIL area of operations. It is encouraging that work in this area is moving forward. I welcome the generous offer of assistance for the Lebanese Armed Forces by Saudi Arabia, which was announced by President Sleiman. I also welcome the offer of the Government of Italy to host an international conference to help to stimulate and channel additional support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. I encourage the international community to further contribute to strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces, including its naval capacity, drawing on the five-year capabilities development plan and also with respect to its activities towards the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) south of the Litani River, as facilitated by the UNIFIL strategic dialogue.

80. I thank the Member States participating in the International Support Group for their continued commitment to Lebanon. Their cooperation has helped to generate important momentum on the assistance agendas mentioned above and underlines on an ongoing basis international support for Lebanon's security and stability and for State institutions, as well as for Lebanon's policy of disassociation. I look forward to working closely with them to the same ends in the coming period and welcome in that regard the intention of France to host a ministerial meeting of the Group.

81. The security situation in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein el-Helweh is of concern and I welcome the efforts of Palestinian camp leaders to work with the Lebanese authorities to maintain order. The need to improve the living conditions of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, without prejudice to the resolution of the refugee question in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement, is ever more urgent. The Palestinian refugee camps are still more crowded as a result of the growing numbers of Palestine refugees displaced from the Syrian Arab Republic. I encourage donors to be forthcoming in support of UNRWA, including to enable it to assist displaced Palestine refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic.

82. Regrettably no progress has been made with regard to the Shab'a Farms area in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 1701 (2006). I call, once again, on Syria and Israel to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area that I provided in October 2007 (S/2007/641).

83. For both Lebanon and Israel the development of their oil and gas reserves is a national priority. I encourage both countries to continue efforts to address the delimitation of their respective maritime exclusive zones and the exploration and exploitation of their natural resources in a manner that facilitates this and does not give rise to tensions. The United Nations remains ready to assist in this matter should both parties so request.

84. Lebanon is going through a very difficult period. Its resilience in the face of challenges arising from the conflict in the neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic has been impressive, but the threats, including from terrorism, have increased sharply in recent months. It is imperative that the international community remains united and committed in its support for Lebanon. Equally it is crucial that all parties in Lebanon come together in addressing the multiple challenges to its stability. The calm prevailing across the Blue Line makes a vital contribution to Lebanon's stability, and to the security and well-being of the peoples of both countries. Longer-term security and stability call for an end to conflict in the region, including progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. Notwithstanding the evident difficulties I will continue to do all in my power to further these goals.

85. I wish to express my appreciation to all countries contributing troops and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I also commend the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and the military and the civilian personnel of UNIFIL, as well as my Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the staff of his Office, all of whom continue to play a critical role in helping to promote stability along the Blue Line and in Lebanon.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2095 (2013) of 14 March 2013. It covers major political and security developments, provides an overview of the human rights situation and outlines the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) since the last report of the Secretary-General, of 5 September 2013 (S/2013/516).

II. Political and security-related developments

2. During the reporting period, the security environment continued to deteriorate, and there was no significant progress in integrating members of brigades into an effective national army and police force or in the disarming of other armed groups. In addition, the management of the transitional period by the General National Congress and the Government was widely criticized within Libya.

3. Heeding public demands for clarity on the sequence and time frame of the remainder of the transitional period, including the constitution-making process, the General National Congress established a road map committee to look into the various proposals for managing the transitional period after 7 February 2014. The end of the tenure of the General National Congress on this date is based on an interpretation of the Constitutional Declaration of 2011 that is accepted by many, though it is contested by a number of political leaders and experts.

4. The abduction of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan for several hours in Tripoli on 10 October 2013 was a clear manifestation of the charged political atmosphere prevalent in the country. The Prime Minister accused two members of the General National Congress, the Anti-Crime Unit and the Libyan Revolutionaries' Operations Room (LROR) of complicity in his abduction. In response, the General National Congress passed legislation on 3 November 2013 giving the Ministry of Defence authority over LROR and setting out clear conditions under which the President of the General National Congress can act unilaterally in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

5. Against this backdrop, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Tarek Mitri, convened a series of high-level consultative meetings with leaders from

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across the political spectrum to forge consensus on the way forward. While a set of principles to guide the transition was adopted, no agreement could be reached on a road map. Three options regarding the constitutional process and general elections were offered to the General National Congress for its consideration.

6. After protracted debate, on 3 February, the General National Congress voted to adopt a "road map" on future transitional arrangements. It stipulated that the tenure of the General National Congress would continue until its authority could be transferred to a constitutionally elected legislative body, subject to the completion of the Constitution drafting process within the four month period outlined in the Constitutional Declaration. Should the Constitution Drafting Assembly conclude two months after convening that it is unable to complete its task within the prescribed time, general elections would be called for a new interim Parliament and President under an amended Constitutional Declaration and new election law. The Parliament and President would serve for a period of 18 months from the date of the first session of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, and any renewal of their terms would be subject to a popular referendum.

7. The reporting period saw the failure of repeated motions within the General National Congress to withdraw confidence from the interim government headed by Prime Minister Zeidan. Concomitantly, major political parties engaged in discussions around a political agreement that included a change of Government and a number of political reforms. At the time of reporting, no agreement had been reached.

8. Progress was made in the work of the commission set up by the Prime Minister in August 2013 to prepare for an inclusive national dialogue that would set the stage for the development of a broad-based peace and reconciliation process. The commission established an advisory body, whose membership is drawn from representatives of the major political parties, civil society organizations, regions and ethnic groups. It also convened two workshops, in which discussions focused on the commission workplan and the parameters of the dialogue model to be adopted for Libya. In January 2014, the commission publicly articulated its vision for a national dialogue conference, which was expected to commence in March. UNSMIL is working closely with the commission, providing it with technical advice and support, and has also drawn upon expertise from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

9. Over the course of the reporting period, armed groups and unarmed protestors closed or disrupted many of the country's oil and gas fields, pipelines, export terminals, refineries and power stations in pursuit of political or financial demands. As a result, national crude oil output dropped at times to as low as 150,000 barrels per day — less than one tenth of peak capacity — and exports, on which Libya is almost entirely dependent for revenue, also fell to alarmingly low levels.

10. The most serious of these oil disruptions was caused by the continuing blockade of oil export terminals in eastern Libya by a pro-federalist group. Successive attempts to resolve the crisis by the Government and the General National Congress, as well as leading tribal figures in eastern Libya, have proven unsuccessful. On 10 December, the group offered to reopen the terminals, subject to a number of conditions, namely, the creation of an oil-revenue oversight committee, the allocation of a proportion of State oil revenues to the east, and an investigation

into alleged fraud in the petroleum industry. However, the offer was withdrawn five days later, with the group blaming the Government for the failure of the talks.

11. On 5 October, United States forces captured Nazih al-Regaei, also known as Abu-Anas al-Libi, in Tripoli and transferred him to United States civilian law enforcement custody in New York. He is currently on trial on charges related to the 1998 United States Embassy bombings in East Africa. Most political leaders condemned this action as a violation of national sovereignty.

Constitution-drafting process

12. Continuing political and security crises have drawn most political and public attention away from the constitution-making process and raised questions regarding the role of the Constitution Drafting Assembly, its relationship with the General National Congress and its schedule. Public anger with both the General National Congress and the Government has given rise to widespread frustration with the political process as a whole. Together, these factors appear to have resulted in public apathy and a reluctance to engage with the constitutional process.

13. On 23 December, in response to mounting public calls to dissolve and replace it with a new legislative body, the General National Congress adopted a resolution stating that the Constitution Drafting Assembly elections would be held in February 2014. Subsequently, the High National Election Commission wrote to the General National Congress recommending, in accordance with the Assembly electoral law, that the vote take place on 20 February. The elections took place as planned, albeit initial polling figures suggested a low turnout nationwide. The timeline also calls for the completion of a draft constitution by July 2014, to be followed by a referendum and general elections.

14. No candidates from the Amazigh community registered for the two Constitution Drafting Assembly seats reserved for them. They objected to what they described as inadequate protections of their rights in the constitutional process. While Tuareg and Tabu candidates registered for their reserved seats, both communities had threatened to boycott the vote. On polling day, Tabu and Tuareg leaders did not allow for polling to take place in Ouvaira and Murzuq districts.

15. In an effort to help the Libyan people prepare to participate in the constitution-drafting process, the United Nations remained actively engaged in supporting civic education and public outreach on constitutional issues. UNSMIL chairs a constitutional support working group that serves as the primary coordination and information-sharing mechanism for international partners. UNDP organized a number of training workshops on constitutional processes and has given support to a Libyan-led national outreach campaign. In collaboration with the United Nations Electoral Support Team, UNDP also trained women's rights advocates on the electoral elements of the constitutional process. Additionally, UNSMIL, jointly with Libyan institutions, organized two workshops in December 2013 on the theme of "Human rights and the Constitution". The events brought together parliamentarians, government officials, academics and human rights activists, and provided an opportunity for a discussion on the protection and promotion of human rights in the future Libyan Constitution. In February 2014, UNDP, in partnership with UNSMIL, organized a one-day introductory training workshop for about 600 candidates for the Constitutional Drafting Assembly on constitutional processes and concepts.

Security situation in Tripoli

16. Noteworthy transformations in the security landscape in Tripoli occurred during the reporting period, with the withdrawal of several major armed revolutionary groups from the capital. Their pull-out followed a series of clashes between rival brigades from Tripoli and Misrata on 4 and 7 November, the deadliest since the end of the armed conflict in 2011. The fighting triggered a wave of popular anger against the continued presence of armed brigades in the capital, with demonstrators taking to the streets in Tripoli and other cities in the country.

17. On 15 November 2013, a mass protest, prompted by calls from the local council and other civil groups for the withdrawal of all armed groups from the city, led to violent confrontations after protestors marched on compounds held by Misratan brigades in the Ghargour district; 46 people were killed and another 516 were injured. Bowing to public pressure, the local, military and consultative councils of Misrata decided to withdraw their city's armed brigades from Tripoli and hand over their bases to State authorities. Although a number of other armed groups in the city followed suit, the status of several others remained unclear.

18. Despite government efforts to assert control over Tripoli and prevent a security void resulting from the withdrawal of some of the revolutionary brigades, there remain serious problems regarding overall public security. Of particular concern is the steadily growing criminality, reflected in the increased number of kidnappings, robberies and hijacking of vehicles.

Eastern Libya

19. The overall situation in eastern Libya continued to raise concern. Deep political and ideological rivalries, a recurrently volatile security situation and the absence of a coherent strategy by the State authorities towards eastern Libya have exacerbated instability in the eastern region, with inevitable consequences for the entire country.

20. The series of targeted assassinations in Benghazi, primarily against serving and former security and judicial personnel, continued almost unabated, despite efforts by national authorities to reinforce security in the city. Separately, tensions between the authorities and the Ansar al-Sharia group, whose presence in the city and its environs had been gradually fortified over the past year, escalated into open fighting on 24 November 2013 between the group and army special forces, resulting in at least nine deaths. The fighting appears to have prompted several subsequent attacks against security forces, including an apparent suicide bombing on 22 December that killed 13 people.

21. Popular protests in Benghazi against the presence of armed groups escalated in the wake of the 24 November clashes. A similar protest movement took place in Derna, where Islamist armed groups have been dominant since the revolution. A succession of demonstrations in early December 2013 forced Ansar al-Sharia to abandon its headquarters in Benghazi. A series of attacks on government and security premises and individuals associated with the campaign followed. The Government appointed a military governor for Benghazi on 6 December and took a number of other steps to reassert State authority. Despite these efforts, the situation remained quite unstable.

22. The stand-off between the central authorities and pro-federalists blockading oil terminals in eastern Libya continued during the reporting period. On 2 October 2013, leaders of the federalist movement announced the appointment of a chief executive and military commander for what they call the autonomous "Federal Region of Barqa". They also named members of an executive bureau and announced plans to appoint a regional legislature. They subsequently announced that they intended to allow oil to be sold from the blockaded terminals to fund the new regional administration, which prompted national authorities to order the navy to intercept any tankers suspected of trying to load oil from the terminals concerned. On 6 January 2014, Libyan naval forces fired warning shots to turn back a Maltese-flagged tanker suspected of trying to approach one of the facilities.

Southern Libya

23. Fighting and kidnappings in southern Libya have increased since December 2013. Clashes between the Tabu community and the Awlad Suleiman tribe erupted on 9 January 2014, resulting in over 90 deaths. A ceasefire brokered on 13 January collapsed days later. Mediation efforts by both Government and civil society representatives remain ongoing, but progress has been limited. A complicating factor was the involvement of armed groups that are perceived to be supporters of the former regime. Following a visit by the Prime Minister to Sabha and its environs on 19 January, the Government announced that it would deploy forces to stabilize the area, which arrived on 29 January. At the time of reporting, the situation in the south remained highly tense.

24. On 28 November, an unidentified force raided one of the main ammunition depots in Barak al-Shati, causing a massive explosion and significant casualties. Attempts by regional military authorities to assume control of the situation in the south and to deploy army and police forces continued to face resistance from several armed militias which have rejected calls to disarm.

25. Heightened tension in Kufra in the south-east and Ajdabiya in the east led to fighting between the Tabu and the Zwaya tribe, which left at least four people dead and prompted a wave of tit-for-tat abductions and burning of homes. In response to promises of government action, Tabu protestors conditionally suspended a two-week blockade of the main highway into Kufra on 11 December 2013. The Tabu and Zwaya sides subsequently reached a prisoner exchange agreement on 6 January 2014. Meanwhile, clashes resumed in mid-January between the Zwaya and Tabu tribes over control of al-Sarir oil fields north of Kufra, resulting in power and water cuts affecting a number of cities in the east, as well as a shortage of goods to south-eastern areas.

III. Activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

A. Electoral support

26. Preparations to elect the Constitution Drafting Assembly continued throughout the reporting period. The High National Election Commission closed candidate nominations on 7 November and completed in-country voter registration on 16 January. Polling day took place on 20 February.

27. The electoral process articulated in Law 17/2013 uses a majoritarian system of voting, with single- and multi-member constituencies, a complex system made even more so by the reservation of six seats for women and six for the Amazigh, the Tuareg and the Tabu communities.

28. The official High National Election Commission list included a total of 649 candidates, of whom 64 were women. The candidates were concentrated in major urban areas. A total of 54 candidates contested the six seats reserved for women, while 19 candidates, including 1 woman, contested the four seats reserved for the Tabu and Tuareg. No candidates were registered for the two seats reserved for the Amazigh component. Campaigning officially began on 25 December 2013 and ended 24 hours before the polls opened on 20 February. Ballot papers were printed abroad by UNDP on behalf of the High National Election Commission.

29. The High National Election Commission employed an innovative short message service system to register voters, one of the first of its kind in the world. Despite the system's technical success, the process was marred by low public participation. Registration by short message service was followed by a one-week in-person registration. A total of approximately 1,102,000 voters registered only after repeated extension of deadlines. Approximately 6,500 people registered for out-of-country voting in 13 countries. Out-of-country voting commenced several days before polling opened in Libya. The figure is modest in comparison with the 2.8 million who reportedly registered and the 1.76 million who voted in the 2012 General National Congress elections. The low registration numbers were an issue of public concern, which was regularly reported on in the media.

30. UNSMIL and its partners continue to provide direct support to the electoral process, providing technical advice through 25 advisers and experts drawn from UNSMIL, UNDP, UNOPS and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and procuring ballot papers and other electoral materials from international suppliers. However, on several occasions, the deteriorating security conditions limited the ability of the United Nations to co-locate advisers with their High National Election Commission counterparts on a daily basis.

31. During the reporting period, the United Nations actively called for transparency and public engagement in the electoral process. UNSMIL and UNDP conducted information and strategy sessions for women candidates. UNDP and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization organized a series of training events for senior media members on standards for electoral coverage. Regular meetings, chaired by the United Nations, were held with international partners to share information on support to the elections in Libya and coordinate responses to emerging problems. UNSMIL and UNDP worked with partners in Tunisia and Egypt to strengthen subregional linkages through a programme of events, including the first international conference in the electoral sector to be held in Libya.

B. Human rights, transitional justice and rule of law

32. Despite some positive developments such as the establishment of the national human rights institution, Libya's human rights protection system remains in need of significant strengthening. During the reporting period, UNSMIL supported efforts to ensure, inter alia, the effective administration of justice, a comprehensive

transitional justice strategy, a strengthened legal framework and an enhanced national human rights institution.

Detentions

33. The Ministry of Justice estimates that less than 7,000 people continue to be detained in relation to the 2011 conflict and are awaiting judicial processes. This represents an ongoing and serious human rights concern. These detainees are held mostly by armed brigades over whom the Government has nominal but not effective authority. In some instances, children are held with adults. UNSMIL has provided assistance to the public prosecution on the screening of detainees and continues to offer its technical advice to accelerate the process. UNSMIL has also insisted that children should not be held together with adults. On 7 December, senior leaders of the Warfallah tribe from Bani Walid, held for more than a year in a prison in al-Zawiya without charge or trial, were released.

34. When detention facilities have been handed over to trained officers of the Judicial Police (Libya's prison service), there have been marked improvements in the condition and treatment of detainees. Otherwise, prolonged detention and interrogation in the absence of effective State control or oversight has created an environment conducive to torture and other forms of ill treatment. As documented in a joint report of UNSMIL and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued on 1 October, torture is widespread particularly immediately after arrest and during the first days of interrogation. Detainees are usually held without access to lawyers and limited to no access to family or relatives. The report documented 27 cases of death in custody since 2011, including 11 in 2013, although the actual figures are believed to be higher. Significant information suggests that torture was the cause of death. The Government of Libya has acknowledged the seriousness of the problem and accepted the recommendations contained in the report.

35. The promulgation of the law on transitional justice on 2 December 2013, requiring that detainees be released or handed over to the judiciary within 90 days, is significant but pending implementation. However, given the lack of State control of the majority of detention facilities, and the absence of a safe environment in which the judiciary can operate, the judicial system faces a significant challenge in meeting such a deadline.

36. UNSMIL will continue its monitoring efforts and its work to assist the Judicial Police in developing its capacity to manage all detention centres in line with international human rights standards.

Trials of senior officials of the former regime

37. On 24 October, the South Tripoli Court endorsed the indictment of 37 senior officials of the former regime, including Saif al-Islam Qadhafi and former intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi. They are charged with crimes relating to the 2011 conflict and are expected to be tried in 2014.

38. On 31 May, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court rejected the admissibility challenge by Libya in the case of Saif al-Islam Qadhafi. Libya appealed that decision and that appeal remained pending during the reporting period. On 11 October 2013, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal

Court decided that the case against Mr. Al-Senussi was inadmissible on the grounds that he was subject to domestic proceedings conducted by the competent Libyan authorities and that those authorities were willing and able to genuinely conduct those proceedings. Mr. Al-Senussi's defence team has appealed the decision.

39. The importance of holding fair trials for members of the former regime and ensuring that any defendant is afforded all guarantees of a fair trial and due process, including the ability to speak freely with counsel in confidence, would be a clear affirmation of the rule of law in Libya. The Minister of Justice has reiterated his determination that trials will be conducted in line with international standards. During the reporting period, UNSMIL visited some senior officials of the former regime currently on trial and made a number of recommendations to the Ministry of Justice in relation to conditions of detention and access to counsel in confidence. UNSMIL will be monitoring the trial proceedings.

Judiciary and prisons

40. The safety of judicial personnel remains a serious concern with attacks, death threats and other forms of intimidation continuing against prosecutors and judges. The most senior prosecutor of the Green Mountain region was assassinated in Derna in November, following the assassination of Derna's most senior judge in June 2013.

41. The Government security apparatus and the Judicial Police do not have the capacity to provide a safe environment for the judiciary to operate effectively or to ensure the security of prisons. UNSMIL, in partnership with UNDP and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, continues to work with the High Judicial Institute and the Ministry of Justice to train prosecutors, judges and the Ministry of Defence Office of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in military justice reform. UNSMIL also continues to advise the Judicial Police on organizational, management and security matters, as well as on the treatment of detainees, in line with international human rights standards. Prison breaks continue, including in Sabha in November 2013 and in Ajdabya in December 2013.

42. In collaboration with the Judicial Police, on 14 and 15 December 2013, UNSMIL organized a round table for all Libyan prison directors, providing an opportunity to share information and discuss ways to overcome existing challenges. Attendees included the Minister of Justice and a number of former leaders of armed brigades who integrated into the Judicial Police. Prison directors adopted recommendations intended to strengthen the Judicial Police and harmonize management approaches.

Transitional justice

43. The new law on transitional justice repeals the previous one issued in 2012 by the National Transitional Council. It represents an important development, as it includes provisions for re-establishing a fact-finding and reconciliation commission to investigate and document human rights violations under the former regime and since the revolution. It also includes provisions on reparations for victims, and emphasizes the importance of accountability and the need for institutional reform.

44. Prior to its promulgation, UNSMIL provided extensive comments relating to the establishment and functioning of the truth commission and of a separate

reparations body, some of which were incorporated into the law. UNSMIL will provide advice and support to the fact-finding and reconciliation commission once its board is appointed, and will continue to assist in the implementation of a comprehensive transitional justice strategy to address abuses committed by all sides and ensure fair trials for all suspects.

45. By the end of December 2013, the commission charged with applying the law on political and administrative isolation reviewed approximately 4,000 cases, identifying 80 individuals for isolation, including 3 General National Congress members, although most cases were under appeal. The overall impact of the law cannot yet be assessed, as some individuals have resigned, were not promoted or were transferred to other positions in anticipation that they would be isolated. According to the Supreme Judicial Council, some 400 judges and prosecutors were reassigned to other functions. Owing to a shortage of judges, many have not yet been replaced, particularly in the south and east, thus placing an additional strain on the judicial institutions that are already facing major challenges.

Violence against women

46. In May 2013, the Minister of Justice submitted a draft law on the care of women victims of rape and violence to the General National Congress, as current legislation does not ensure adequate protection in this regard. The draft law foresees the provision of reparations, including compensation, health care, psychosocial support and shelter. UNSMIL continued to provide advice to the General National Congress and the Ministry of Justice on the development of comprehensive legislation on this and related matters during the reporting period. In January 2014, the Minister called on the General National Congress to accelerate the adoption of this legislation.

National human rights institution

47. Following some operational difficulties, the National Council of Civil Liberties and Human Rights is now fully staffed. In December 2013, UNSMIL, with the support of OHCHR, deployed a consultant to provide technical support to the Council in its efforts to achieve compliance with the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (the "Paris Principles").

C. Security sector

48. Security sector governance at the national level remains hampered by lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities and an ill-defined security sector architecture that has failed to undergo significant reform or manage the security crises effectively. As a result, a well-defined government plan to rebuild and reform State security institutions remains elusive. At the same time, there has been little progress in implementing the security provisions in the Security, Justice and Rule of Law Development Plan agreed by the Government of Libya in Paris in February 2013.

49. The resolution of current security issues in Libya and progress in security sector reform require the active cooperation of revolutionary and other armed formations operating in the country. The need remains for the Government and the General National Congress to engage these armed groups in order to reach agreement on their absorption into State institutions or a return of their members to civilian life.

Security sector architecture and coordination

50. The absence of an agreed strategy and lack of a clear division of national security responsibilities between the President of the General National Congress, the Prime Minister, the General National Congress security committees and the executive ministries continue to impede the direction and coordination of security sector reform in Libya. The continuing absence of a comprehensive national security architecture has meant that individual efforts by ministries or other agencies has been sporadic, dispersed and poorly resourced. UNSMIL will continue to provide advice on national security architecture and security sector governance. In this context, it is important that security is given comprehensive consideration in the national dialogue process.

51. The inter-ministerial coordination committees for reintegration and border security have been carrying out important work under the current difficult circumstances. Plans for the establishment of further committees, notably for the control of arms and ammunition are encouraging. These committees are valuable in establishing dialogue and cooperation, and making recommendations on policy and strategy that cross ministerial boundaries. However, they cannot be considered as a substitute for proper security governance through the ministries, particularly in the implementation of development plans. Their work needs the active support of ministers within an overall security framework, if they are to be effective.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

52. There has been some progress made in the integration of revolutionaries into the police and the Libyan army and the work of the committee that was formed following General National Congress Decision 53 of 2013 to coordinate and oversee this process. The decision calls on the Government to develop a security plan to integrate all "legitimate" armed groups into the State security forces and to disband all those deemed "illegitimate". The committee is also playing a key role in coordinating reintegration activities and establishing credibility for the provision of alternative livelihoods for former revolutionaries. Its work forms a key part in creating the appropriate conditions for armed groups to enter a dialogue leading to voluntary disarmament and the national control of arms. In that regard, while figures for reintegration in the army remain unclear, the Ministry of the Interior reports having registered 101,086 Supreme Security Committee members across Libya as at 10 December 2013. That includes 2,993 who are under training, 18,882 who are awaiting training, 29,194 who did not meet the criteria for entry, 29,774 in the vetting and selection process, and 19,531 who completed training.

53. The Warriors' Affairs Commission for Rehabilitation and Development recently published a comprehensive strategy to reintegrate 160,000 former revolutionaries. The strategy includes social, political, economic and education programmes, and is supported by UNSMIL, United Nations agencies and some Member States.

Border security

54. While there has been little progress in improving Libyan border security, it is encouraging to note that there is developing cooperation in the recently formed Inter-ministerial Committee on Border Management, assisted by both UNSMIL and the European Union Border Assistance Mission. There is growing interest among

various agencies regarding coordination of their border activities. UNSMIL and the European Union Border Assistance Mission, assisted by Member States, are exploring areas for joint programming. There is also increasing interest in developing a regional approach to border security, and Libya is playing an active part in that process. Following the Regional Ministerial Conference on Border Security in Rabat in November 2013, which made a series of concrete recommendations, Libya has agreed to organize a secretariat for future meetings and to follow up on the conclusions of the conference.

Arms and ammunition management

55. Unsecured and damaged arms and ammunition, stockpiled weapons, chemical weapons material, easily accessible small arms and light weapons, explosive remnants of war, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices continue to pose a serious threat to national, regional and international security. Incidents like the ammunition depot explosion, which occurred on 24 November 2013 in Sabha, underscore the need for safe and secure ammunition and arms management. A total of 408 small arms-related incidents occurred during the reporting period, killing 402 and injuring 919 people; 120 incidents related to improvised explosive devices killed 45 people and injured approximately 100 others.

56. The Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section of UNSMIL, supported through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), continues to assist the Libyan authorities in developing a comprehensive strategy for arms and ammunition management. The strategy includes rehabilitation plans for ammunition storage areas, weapons control management, safe and secure disposal of chemical weapons and material, and national regulations for the safe storage and handling of ammunition. The strategy will further inform the development of national standards consistent with international best practices. A senior Ammunition Technical Officer has been deployed to Libya to assist in the identification of stockpile management methods suitable for the Libyan Armed Forces and their command structure. Prime Minister Zeidan also indicated his intention to form a Committee for Arms and Ammunition to develop Libyan capacity to deal with surplus arms and ammunition and produce a long-term plan for the storage and handling of stocks required by the Libyan authorities.

57. Furthermore, the Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section is in the process of developing a multi-year nationwide plan to complement the arms and ammunition management strategy and contribute to an enabling environment for wider Libyan disarmament efforts; specifically, the disposal of surplus, unserviceable and damaged arms and ammunition. These activities will require sustained engagement by the international community to support the enhancement of institutional governance and security structures.

58. The Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section, with UNMAS assistance, continued to provide support to the Government of Libya by coordinating efforts for the clearance of landmines and other unexploded ordinance and explosive remnants of war, as well as the provision of technical and operational support to the Ministries of Defence and the Interior.

59. UNMAS has cleared 49,592 explosive remnants of war and landmines covering a total of 13.5 square kilometres of economically viable land and military areas. However, the availability of explosives to fully destroy these hazardous items

remains a significant obstacle. UNMAS, in cooperation with other United Nations agencies, conducted 355 explosives risk education activities during the reporting period, benefitting a total of 8,258 people. Meanwhile, a national mine action strategy was adopted by various national mine action counterparts, and was officially endorsed by the Ministry of Defence in December 2013. UNDP and UNSMIL contributed to the draft strategy through the provision of technical expertise and advice.

60. Despite those efforts, without additional financial support, the proliferation of unsecured arms and ammunitions and the presence of unexploded ordinance and landmines will continue to exacerbate the already frail security situation and increase the threat posed to civilian populations in Libya and neighbouring countries.

61. On 16 December, the General National Congress passed legislation criminalizing the civilian possession of heavy and medium weapons and ammunitions. The law sets a three-month deadline for the handover of such weapons and ammunition, and makes licensing of all other light weapons obligatory. This legislation, however, has not been backed up by practical arrangements for its implementation.

Defence sector reform

62. During the reporting period, progress on defence sector reform was interrupted by the two-month delay in the appointment of the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff. Under the current incumbents, there has been slow but steady progress in many areas, although a well-defined plan for the overall role and structure of the army has yet to be agreed.

63. There have been significant advances in training. Several Member States have begun the overseas training of a general purpose force, a process expected to continue for up to two years. The Ministry of Defence is also conducting in-country training at six centres to prepare those deploying overseas, with plans for further training to take place inside Libya with international support, in addition to individual training carried out by Member States.

64. The Libyan public welcomed the deployment of the army onto the streets of Tripoli and Benghazi during the tragic events of November 2013, raising its morale and effectiveness. It is critical that this trend be sustained through the encouragement by the political leadership and organization and effective use of the troops who have received training both overseas and in Libya.

65. It is encouraging to note that the Government has decided to increase the basic military salary to encourage recruitment, particularly among former revolutionaries, and has taken steps to redress the unbalanced rank and age structure of the army by retiring senior officers and recruiting younger soldiers.

Police reform

66. UNSMIL and Member States have continued to devote significant effort to police reform, most notably in the areas of operational policing, diplomatic security, procurement, human resources, training, criminal investigation, community policing and child and family protection. While much appreciated by the Libyan authorities, this assistance must be complemented by a similar effort to reorganize the Ministry

of the Interior and create an independent police force with professional standards in accordance with international best practices.

67. With assistance from the global focal points for police, justice and corrections, UNSMIL and UNDP have joined efforts to support the Ministry of the Interior and the police to improve policing in Libya. Three major themes have been identified that involve institutional reform, public safety and community policing. This joint support is expected to be initiated as soon as possible.

68. In September 2013, the Ministry of the Interior, with the support of UNSMIL, conducted a workshop on police reform and development that brought together representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, other ministries, civil society representatives and representatives of the international community. The participants developed recommendations on restructuring the Ministry of the Interior and the police, internal and external oversight mechanisms, security threat assessment and community policing. UNSMIL is following up with the Ministry of the Interior to establish a High Committee for Police Reform and Development.

69. The introduction of a community policing concept started in Tripoli, and two workshops for police and the local community were organized. UNSMIL is also working on the establishment of a Family and Child Protection Unit with the Tripoli Police Directorate in cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund.

70. In preparation for the Constitution Drafting Assembly elections, the Ministry of the Interior established the High Election Security Committee, which is headed by the Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs. UNSMIL has supported the Committee by holding a workshop on the theme "Lessons learned from the 2012 General National Congress election security and preparation of security plan for Constitution Drafting Assembly election", developing a police handbook for election security and developing a training programme on election security. UNSMIL also conducted six "train-the-trainer" courses for 88 police training officers. UNSMIL and officials from the Ministry of the Interior will also conduct field visits to support election security preparation in the regions.

D. Coordination of international assistance

71. As part of ongoing UNSMIL support to the Office of the Prime Minister, an agreement was signed with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) in December 2013 to establish a Technical Support Unit within the Office of the Prime Minister, funded by the Government of Libya, to provide technical expertise and improve implementation capacity and coordination on the main national priority areas.

72. In accordance with the United Nations integrated strategic framework for Libya for the period 2013-2014, the United Nations country team in Libya has completed the mid-year review for both the integrated strategic framework and the country team strategic framework. The results show positive achievements in the areas of health and education, while indicating some challenges in the effective utilization of available United Nations resources to build national capacity. The results of both reviews show that the unstable security situation represents a major obstacle for the implementation of projects and programmes.

73. UNSMIL continues to convene sectoral working groups to ensure better coordination of international assistance to Libya. Most international partners continue to participate actively in the work of these groups. Libyan ownership of the coordination process is now increasing as national counterparts demonstrate more active participation. UNSMIL will continue to insist on the need for Libyan authorities to exercise effective leadership and avails itself to contribute towards the development of such a role.

74. Preparations for the convening of the ministerial conference in support of Libya, to be held in Rome in early March, are well under way. In this regard, UNSMIL and international partners are working in close consultation with the Libyan authorities. The conference, which is intended to provide a platform for the political support of the international community to the Libyan authorities and its people, will build on the partnership agreed during the previous ministerial conference held in Paris, in 2013, in support of the priorities identified by the Government of Libya in the areas of security, rule of law and justice, and its vision to deliver concrete benefits to the Libyan people.

E. Humanitarian situation

75. In November, the World Health Organization visited various border entry points in support of the Ministry of Health to help implement health security measures to prevent the entry and spread of communicable diseases.

76. The challenges related to the management of migration to Libya are immense, and conditions for migrants remain dire. IOM has been providing direct assistance to meet basic needs of migrants, including non-food items, health services, and return and reintegration assistance, as well as improving living conditions in reception centres. It also helped build the capacity of government entities that have a role in migration management. To date, IOM has assisted 1,083 migrants to voluntarily return to their countries of origin through a European Union-funded programme. Libyan authorities and neighbouring countries need to make concerted efforts to prevent unnecessary loss of life at sea and to protect particularly vulnerable migrants, such as trafficked people and unaccompanied minors.

77. IOM continued to provide psychosocial assistance through its community centres in Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata. Community members have come to own this initiative in a visible manner.

IV. Safety and security

78. The security situation in Libya continues to remain tense and unpredictable. Fighting between armed groups, assassinations, carjackings, abductions, civil unrest and terrorism-related incidents remain likely to occur, given the absence of law and order, illegal armed groups, unresolved tribal disputes and various unresolved political issues.

79. A number of criminal incidents, including carjackings, intimidation and robberies, targeted the international community during the period under review. The most significant included the attack against the Russian embassy in Tripoli, the attempted abduction of the Turkish Consul in Benghazi, the bomb attack on the

Finnish and Swedish consulates in Benghazi, the killing of a teacher from the United States in Benghazi, the killing of a Turkish national in Tripoli, and the killing of British and New Zealand nationals near Mellitah Oil and Gas Company. On two separate occasions, United States nationals were detained and later released in Al Ujalat, Sabratha and Benghazi. The most significant incident involving United Nations-related personnel was the armed attack on an IOM vehicle in Tripoli on 19 December 2013.

80. In view of significant security incidents throughout the country and the inability of the host Government to provide effective security, United Nations programmes have continued with undeniable constraints and limitations. The United Nations intensified its efforts to protect and ensure the safety and security of its staff by refining its integrated approach with respect to staff dispersal, facilities management and movement. These were necessary steps to enable the continuation of United Nations operations and programme delivery.

81. On 21 November 2013, the Secretary-General wrote a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/704) recommending the deployment of a United Nations guard unit to ensure security for United Nations staff and premises in Tripoli. Once made public, the proposal to send a military force of up to 232 people provoked a public controversy. The Government of Libya and UNSMIL spared no efforts to dissipate misinterpretations. The Security Council had been informed about those developments, underlining the need to avoid exacerbating suspicions, no matter how unjustifiable they may be. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General called for a revision of the initial plan in a way deemed by UNSMIL most adapted to the Libyan situation. The Security Council response was supportive. Other options are being considered and a new proposal is to be finalized soon.

V. Mission development and implementation of mission concept

82. As at 31 December 2013, a total of 235 UNSMIL international and national staff members and 11 Government-provided personnel had been deployed to UNSMIL, of whom 221 are posted in Libya. In January 2014, UNSMIL regrettably lost the head of the Benghazi subregional office and the Training and Development Officer, both of whom died in their respective home countries during their rest and recuperation leave. In his report of 5 September 2013 (S/2013/516), the Secretary-General highlighted the challenges related to identifying and recruiting individuals with the necessary specialist skills in areas such as security sector reform and constitution-making process for work in Libya.

83. UNSMIL continues to implement its mission concept with an emphasis on flexibility and responsiveness to needs on the ground and the normative responsibilities of the United Nations. The Mission's small core of relatively senior advisers across a range of highly specialized technical areas of expertise, such as security sector reform, constitution drafting, and women's empowerment, are complemented by Government-provided personnel, consultants, members of the standby mediation team of the Department of Political Affairs, and staff and consultants engaged through the country team to perform priority tasks reflected in the integrated strategic framework. In 2013 UNSMIL responded to the Government request for support with 18 consultants in areas such as military procurement and personnel systems, public speaking for senior officials, transitional justice and

judicial reform, and ammunition storage. UNSMIL made use of the Government-provided personnel modality to provide support in areas such as police training and penitentiary reform.

84. As at 31 December 2013, women represented 31 per cent of the 235 staff on board: 50 per cent of national professionals, 33 per cent of international professionals, 33 per cent of the leadership posts, and 27 per cent of field service staff. Retaining staff is a challenge. Since mission start-up through the end of 2013, 78 staff on temporary or fixed-term assignments departed UNSMIL. Of these, 60 per cent (47) were international professional staff. Women represented 44 per cent of staff departing over the Mission's life span, and 57 per cent of the departing international professional staff. Clearly, women are departing in larger proportions than they are being recruited. As is typically the case in field missions, it is difficult to retain mid-level women. It is also difficult to identify and retain women in leadership positions.

85. UNSMIL has filled 33 international professional posts through post-specific job openings, 36 per cent (12) of which were filled with women candidates, of whom 7 are at the senior level of P-5 and above. UNSMIL has been challenged to attract and recruit national professional expertise in a number of areas, particularly translation, interpretation, human rights, political affairs and public information.

VI. Financial aspects

86. By its resolution 68/247, the General Assembly approved an amount of $46,681,500 for UNSMIL for the period 1 January to 31 December 2014.

VII. Observations and recommendations

87. As elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa region, radical political transformations came with the hope of new opportunities and a better future. The Libyan experience is an example of how political transitions are fraught with difficulties and risks, at times even threatening to derail the very same movement for change for which the revolutions were fought. Developments in Libya underscore the urgent need for the country's political forces to firmly commit themselves to the democratic process.

88. Elections, while essential, are not the sole agent of democratization, especially given Libya's post-conflict dynamics. The huge task of forging a renewed civic consciousness cannot be underestimated. Upholding principles of political pluralism and the recognition of diversity are central to any democratic process. Institutions and mechanisms that facilitate inclusion and the search for consensus are key to a successful transition. Many Libyans appear to be increasingly sceptical about the credibility of the political process and disappointed by the slow progress in implementing political and security reforms and improving governance. There is an urgent requirement to address this mounting public frustration, so that Libya's political transition does not suffer a major setback, with grave consequences for its stability and that of the region.

89. The success of the transition in Libya will hinge in large part on the commitment of its leaders from across the political, civil society and revolutionary

spectrum to an inclusive dialogue, aimed at forging consensus on a range of defining issues, including the political system, functions and roles of state institutions, reform of the security sector and national reconciliation.

90. In that regard, the Secretary-General is encouraged by the steps already taken to facilitate consultations among political leaders and prepare for national dialogue. He reiterates the commitment of the United Nations to support inclusiveness, transparency and the pursuit of mutually agreed national priorities. He also calls on all parties in Libya to voice their unambiguous support for the national dialogue and to agree on a unified approach in order to maximize the chances of its success.

91. The situation in Benghazi and the east is disturbing, given the continued and accelerating spate of assassinations. The Secretary-General remains deeply concerned by the apparent lack of progress in investigating these killings, identifying the perpetrators and bringing them to justice. The impact of this growing violence and intimidation is bound to undermine not only security in the east, but the country's stability as a whole. The Secretary-General therefore calls on the authorities to assume their responsibilities in providing security and putting an end to impunity. He also urges all parties in Benghazi and the east generally to join efforts in rejecting the use of violence to achieve political objectives.

92. Given its importance for the future of Libya, the constitutional process has rightly received attention from Libyans and the international community alike. A successful constitutional process will require a conducive political and security environment and the forging of a broad national consensus. A Constitution that is arrived at in such a manner will reflect the shared values that bind Libyans together, affirm a national identity and define the character and role of the State and its main institutions. The Secretary-General urges all parties not to jeopardize this historic undertaking in the pursuit of short-term political gains.

93. The continued detention of thousands of detainees by armed groups outside effective State control remains a serious human rights and rule of law concern. The Secretary-General calls on all parties to complete the release or handover of all detainees to the effective custody of State institutions as quickly as possible, and to allow the judicial process to proceed in accordance with international human rights standards. In addition, allegations of torture should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice.

94. Libyan judges, prosecutors and prison officials continue to face major obstacles. The Secretary-General reiterates his previous recommendation that the Libyan authorities adopt a security plan for the justice sector. This is absolutely necessary for ensuring the fair screening of detainees, the security of prisons and the conduct of trials in line with international standards.

95. The Secretary-General welcomes the adoption of the law on transitional justice, which can play an important role in addressing the legacy of past abuses. He encourages the Libyan authorities to ensure its full implementation, specifically the establishment of an effective truth commission and a fair reparations policy. He urges the Libyans to intensify their efforts to address the issues of missing persons and the internally displaced according to international human rights and humanitarian standards.

96. The volatile security situation is linked to the slow progress in security sector reform, which can only be accelerated with the serious commitment of all parties. In

that regard, the Secretary-General urges the Government to redouble its efforts to establish national security governance structures and reform and strengthen existing institutions.

97. Progress in reintegration has been hindered by the precarious security situation in Libya, the weakness of its security institutions and the absence of systematic engagement with the armed groups. It is essential to agree on a shared vision, design a coherent plan and establish sufficient trust for the handing over of weapons.

98. The United Nations will continue to offer its full support and assistance to the Libyan authorities in accordance with the principles of national ownership. To that end, the Secretary-General recommends that the Security Council renew the mandate of UNSMIL for another 12 months as an integrated special political mission in the areas provided for by the Security Council in its resolutions 2009 (2011), 2022 (2011), 2040 (2012) and 2095 (2013). Taking into account the priorities of the Government, the United Nations will intensify its focus in particular on facilitating dialogue among Libyan political forces, providing support for the establishment of an inclusive national dialogue, and supporting the constitutional process. Additionally, UNSMIL plans to expand its work on the safe storage of arms and ammunition throughout the country. The United Nations will continue to make available resources and expertise in support of these national priorities.

99. The Secretary-General reiterates the United Nations commitment to support the Libyan people during this difficult transition. He calls on all Libyans to stand united in rejecting all forms of political violence, and he commends the Libyan authorities for their commitment to Libya's democratic transition. He also extends his gratitude to all international partners for their continued collaboration with the United Nations in the implementation of its mandate. Finally, the Secretary-General wishes to extend his sincere thanks to his Special Representative and the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations system for their efforts to support Libya's transition.

United Nations S/2014/132

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 February 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 26 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith an official statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in connection with the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation of 24 February 2014 on the current political situation in Ukraine (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Sergeyev**
Permanent Representative

14-24768 (E) 270214

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 26 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine in connection with the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on 24 February 2014

Reacting to the statement the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation published on 24 February 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine considers it necessary to declare the following.

Acute social and political crisis, accompanied by violence of the past regime, demanded swift and effective counteraction to overcome it. It was the purpose of the Agreement on resolving the crisis in Ukraine, signed on 21 February 2014. However, the self-withdrawal of the former leaders of the state from fulfilling its responsibilities created obstacles to the due implementation of the agreements.

At the same time, the Parliament of Ukraine, the only legislative body and a legitimate institution of official power, claimed responsibility for the normalization of the situation in the country and decided to enforce most of the provisions of this Agreement, in particular, the decision to return to the Constitution of 2004, appointing the extraordinary presidential elections on 25 May 2014.

Creation of the "Government of national unity" continues.

Key decisions of the Parliament of Ukraine aimed to normalize the situation in the country, voted by the constitutional majority of people's deputies of Ukraine that represent all parliamentary political forces.

The legitimacy of decisions taken by Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine has already gained recognition from many international partners of our country.

Today in Kyiv, as well as in other cities of Ukraine, public peace and order were restored. With this purpose the Ukrainian law machinery, using the principles of openness and tolerance, adjusted an effective cooperation with local communities.

As a part of the process of the restoration of national unity, primordial attention is now given to the consideration of interests of all citizens from all regions of Ukraine in order to prevent violations of their legal rights.

Thus, all necessary steps towards removing the State from the current crisis and stabilizing our society are actually undertaken by the new Governance.

Allegations contained in the statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry regarding so-called "threats to civil rights, particularly of minorities and religious confessions" are absolutely false and are not based on the proven facts.

This statement also contains biased and non-relevant allegations regarding "terrorist methods of suppressing dissent" and distribution of "neo-Nazi ideology" by the political parties that gained the support of the biggest majority of the Ukrainian people during the parliamentary elections of 2012, which is taking nowadays all responsibility for the situation in the country.

At this stage, Ukraine is particularly interested in supporting the efforts of the international community to ensure economic stability and prevent potential threats to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the State. Special expectations, in this context, are relying on the Guarantor States of the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine in accordance with the Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum).

Thus, Ukraine reconfirms big importance of the recent statement of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (as one of the parties to the Budapest Memorandum) on the inadmissibility of external interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine and the importance of creating conditions for Ukraine's development as a part of a pan-European family.

For our part, we reiterate a strong commitment to Ukrainian-Russian relations based on a new, truly equal and good-neighbourhood basis, what was particularly underlined in the address to the Ukrainian people made by the Acting President of Ukraine, Head of the Ukrainian Parliament, H.E. Mr. Oleksandr Turchynov.

Right after the formation of the new Government, the Ukrainian party will be ready to restore the full-scale bilateral dialogue within the frameworks of institutions of the Ukrainian-Russian Interstate Commission.

Kyiv, 25 February 2014

United Nations S/2014/133

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 February 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 27 February 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the fifth monthly report of the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) (see annex). The present letter provides information requested in that resolution on the activities of the United Nations that took place from 21 January 2014 to 21 February 2014 related to the implementation of the resolution.

Introduction

In its decisions of 27 September 2013 (EC-M-33/DEC.1) and 15 November 2013 (EC-M-34/DEC.1), the Executive Council of OPCW established a series of intermediate milestones, as well as a deadline for the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. The intermediate milestones included dates for the destruction of chemical weapons production and mixing/filling equipment, unfilled chemical munitions, containers with residual mustard agent, specialized features and buildings related to chemical weapons production facilities. The intermediate milestones also included the removal of chemical weapons material from the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction outside the country, and the destruction of isopropanol inside the country.

The Syrian Arab Republic met the early milestones, including the functional destruction of its capacity to produce, mix and fill chemical weapons munitions, and the destruction of all unfilled chemical munitions. It destroyed its mobile production facilities and specialized equipment and special features at a number of chemical weapons production facilities. In addition, during the last reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic made considerable progress in destroying the isopropanol inside the country.

Two intermediate milestones, 31 December 2013 and 5 February 2014, for the removal of chemical weapons material from the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction outside the country were not met. As a result, the process of eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic has fallen behind schedule. This delay is not insurmountable. It does, however, require an acceleration and intensification of efforts by the Syrian Arab Republic, based on timely, predictable and volume-based movements of chemical materials.

14-24526 (E) 270214

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Activities towards the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic

During the reporting period, the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (Joint Mission) continued to work with Member States to ensure that the Syrian Arab Republic has the equipment and materials required to meet its obligations. The Joint Mission assisted the Syrian Arab Republic in its planning and implementation of preparatory activities in Damascus, in Latakia and at the chemical weapons sites. The Joint Mission continued to monitor, verify and inspect the progress related to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

The Syrian Arab Republic has pre-positioned the majority of packaging and loading equipment at identified sites. As a result of a test conducted by the Joint Mission on containers carrying liquid chemicals in order to verify compliance with international standards for the handling of hazardous goods, the Syrian Arab Republic was advised to decant select chemicals into new drums supplied by Member States. This would serve to mitigate the risks of accidents and spillage during transportation. The Syrian Arab Republic took action accordingly. Based on the advice of the Joint Mission, and as part of the effort to accelerate activities, the Syrian Arab Republic carried out internal movements to consolidate the chemical material in fewer sites and, in one case, to better secure chemicals stored in a site reported as being under threat of attack by armed opposition groups.

Further to a decision taken by the OPCW Executive Council on 30 January 2014 regarding the destruction of isopropanol inside the country, the Syrian Arab Republic destroyed a large majority of this chemical over a four-day period in early February 2014. This was verified by Joint Mission personnel. The small percentage that remains is stored at a site that is currently inaccessible owing to the security situation. It is scheduled to be destroyed by the Syrian Arab Republic and verified as such by the Joint Mission as soon as access becomes permissive.

On 27 January 2014 and 10 February 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic carried out movements of chemical weapons material from a number of sites to Latakia port. The material was processed in the port and loaded onto cargo vessels by Syrian personnel who have received appropriate training for this purpose. On 27 January 2014, the security situation did not permit Joint Mission verification at the sites from where the chemicals were to be transported; however, remote verification was conducted using camera surveillance equipment. On 10 February 2014, Joint Mission personnel conducted physical verification at the sites of origin prior to movement. On both dates, the Joint Mission conducted verification activities prior to the containers being loaded at the port. The cargo vessels remain in international waters waiting for additional movements, accompanied by a naval escort from participating Member States.

There have been no further movements of chemical material during the period covered by this report. The Syrian Arab Republic has reiterated its intent to complete the full removal of its chemical material for destruction, as required in relevant Executive Council decisions. Upon request, and in close consultation with the Director-General of OPCW and the Joint Mission, the Syrian Arab Republic has produced a sequenced plan regarding future movements. Further to discussions with

OPCW and the Joint Mission, the Syrian Arab Republic subsequently resubmitted the plan with a revised timeline.

The Syrian Arab Republic insists on the need for certain additional security assets that it deems essential for the security of the movement operation in-country. This includes so-called armoured jackets that the Syrian Arab Republic has procured locally with funding provided by the Joint Mission from the United Nations trust fund. These jackets are intended to shield the containers carrying certain chemical material during movement to Latakia. An initial batch is now available and the remainder are to be delivered throughout February. This also includes other security assets identified by the Syrian Arab Republic as being necessary for further movements such as explosive detection devices and electronic countermeasures. It is understood that this issue is being resolved on a bilateral basis.

During the reporting period, the Special Coordinator of the Joint Mission continued her engagement with the Syrian Arab Republic and other States party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. She maintained regular contact with me and with the Director-General of OPCW to ensure close coordination between the Joint Mission, OPCW headquarters and United Nations Headquarters.

The Joint Mission continued its liaison and coordination activities respectively from its offices in Damascus, Latakia, New York and Nicosia. In Damascus, Joint Mission personnel continued daily meetings with the Syrian authorities focusing on accelerating ground movements, and inspectors accompanied Syrian counterparts to various sites to verify and inspect progress. In Latakia, the Joint Mission worked with port authorities to enhance preparedness to receive and quickly process chemical material and to further bolster emergency response capabilities. In New York the Joint Mission maintained its regular liaison and outreach to Member States, as well as engaging with relevant entities across the United Nations Secretariat to ensure coherence and coordination with the United Nations. In Nicosia, the Joint Mission continued to facilitate information-sharing and coordination with maritime task force partners on relevant maritime issues.

The Joint Mission continued to work with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) to assess environmental and public health risks related to these activities and to provide timely advice to the Syrian authorities on appropriate mitigation measures. UNEP and WHO experts visited Latakia to discuss measures with the local authorities. WHO, in close consultation with the Joint Mission, is organizing training and providing equipment to strengthen the ability of local health-care facilities to respond to any possible incident that could occur during the removal of the chemical materials.

As reported, the security situation inside the Syrian Arab Republic remained precarious during the reporting period. Syrian authorities informed that there had been two attempted attacks on convoys carrying chemical material on 27 January 2014. In addition, Syrian authorities indicated that ongoing military activities rendered two sites inaccessible during most of the reporting period, delaying in-country destruction of the final quantities of isopropanol, preventing some activities to consolidate chemical material into a reduced number of locations, and preventing the physical verification of chemical material prior to movement on 27 January 2014.

The security of the Joint Mission ultimately remains the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic. Nevertheless, the Joint Mission continuously assesses the security situation to identify threats and to mitigate risks to its personnel and assets. In response to threats received, the Joint Mission continued to reinforce its safety and security procedures and enforced additional security measures for all its personnel based inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

In accordance with paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the United Nations, OPCW and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic signed the tripartite status of mission agreement on 5 February 2014. A memorandum of understanding for the provision of medical services was also signed on the same day, the text having been agreed earlier.

Conclusion

The elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic stands at a critical juncture. Measurable progress has been made over the last months in the destruction of critical equipment and special features at a number of chemical weapons production facilities, as well as unfilled chemical munitions. As a result, the production, mixing and filling capabilities of the Syrian Arab Republic have been rendered inoperable.

The international community has continued its support for the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic declared chemical weapons programme both directly and through generous funding of both United Nations and OPCW trust funds; through the provision of considerable quantities of material and equipment; and through the deployment of a significant maritime presence in the eastern Mediterranean. These actions are being carried out at great expense and remain a clear demonstration of the commitment of the international community to the elimination of the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

While progress has been attained under challenging circumstances, it is clear that the Syrian Arab Republic must further intensify and accelerate its efforts towards the full elimination of its chemical weapons programme by 30 June 2014. In this regard, I now expect the Syrian Arab Republic to uphold its commitment to the systematic, consistent and volume-based movement of chemical weapons material from all remaining sites to the port for onward transportation and out-of-country destruction.

I would like to reiterate my gratitude to all Member States who have made available funding and assets to advance the process of eliminating the chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. I am also grateful to the Special Coordinator and the staff of the Joint Mission for their work under hazardous and difficult circumstances inside the Syrian Arab Republic.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex urgently to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Annex

Letter dated 26 February 2014 from the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you my report entitled "Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme" prepared in accordance with the relevant provisions of OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), both dated 27 September 2013, for transmission to the Security Council (see enclosure). My report covers the period from 23 January 2014 to 22 February 2014 and also covers the reporting requirements of Executive Council decision EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013.

(*Signed*) Ahmet **Üzümcü**

Enclosure

[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish]

Progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme

1. In accordance with subparagraph 2 (f) of the decision by the Executive Council (hereinafter the "Council") at its Thirty-Third Meeting (EC-M-33/DEC.1), dated 27 September 2013), the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") reports to the Council on a monthly basis regarding the implementation of that decision. In accordance with paragraph 12 of United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the report by the Secretariat is also submitted to the Security Council through the Secretary-General. This is the fifth such monthly report.

2. The Council, at its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, adopted a decision entitled "Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities" (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013). In paragraph 22 of this decision, the Council decided that the Secretariat should report on its implementation "in conjunction with its reporting required by subparagraph 2 (f) of Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1".

3. This report is therefore submitted in accordance with both above-mentioned Council decisions and includes information relevant to their implementation during the period from 23 January to 22 February 2014.[1]

Progress achieved by the Syrian Arab Republic in meeting the requirements of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC-M-34/DEC.1

4. In accordance with subparagraph 1 (c) of EC-M-33/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to complete the elimination of all chemical weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of EC-M-34/DEC.1 establish intermediate completion dates for the removal and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons prior to their complete elimination in the first half of 2014. Progress achieved within the reporting period by the Syrian Arab Republic in fulfilling these obligations is described below:

(a) Pursuant to subparagraphs 2 (a) (ii) and (iii) of EC-M-34/DEC.1, all chemicals listed in those subparagraphs were due to have been removed from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic by 31 December 2013 and 5 February 2014, respectively. However, these objectives were not met. In this regard, the Director-General encouraged the Syrian authorities to provide a time frame for the expeditious removal of these chemicals. On 27 January and 10 February 2014, further limited shipments of priority chemicals were transported to the port of embarkation at Latakia and loaded onto the Danish and Norwegian cargo ships, which means that 4.5% of Priority 1 chemicals have now been removed from the Syrian Arab Republic and, combined with the destruction of certain chemicals

[1] This report takes into account information relating to an amended time frame for the transportation of all chemicals, as submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Director-General on 23 February 2014.

within the Syrian Arab Republic as described in subparagraph 4 (d) below, a total of 17.2% of declared priority chemicals have either been destroyed or removed;

(b) In response to the Director-General's request, on 14 February 2014 the Syrian authorities provided a timeline for the removal of chemicals outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. The timeline, based on a total of 31 sequential movements of chemicals from the chemical weapons storage facilities (CWSFs) to the port of embarkation, estimated that complete removal could be achieved in approximately 100 days, with completion at the end of May 2014. On 13 and 14 February 2014, this timeline was discussed in the framework of the Operational Planning Group (OPG), which developed an alternative plan envisaging that chemicals could be removed by 31 March 2014, while addressing Syrian concerns regarding security and the availability of equipment and personnel. The Director-General encouraged the Syrian authorities to give serious consideration to this alternative plan. In a communication received on 20 February 2014 from the Head of the Syrian National Authority and Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Faisal Mekdad, it was mentioned that the Syrian Arab Republic was reviewing its timeline and will seek to shorten it to the extent considered possible. On 23 February 2014, the Syrian Arab Republic provided a revised time frame. According to this schedule, the Syrian Arab Republic aims to complete the removal of all chemicals from its territory by 13 April 2014, except for chemicals located in facilities that are presently inaccessible. These chemicals could be removed whenever conditions are deemed suitable for movements from these sites but in any event are scheduled for transportation by 27 April 2014, according to the revised schedule;

(c) Pursuant to subparagraph 2 (b) of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is requested to destroy all of its chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) by 15 March 2014. As previously reported, a total of 26 CWPFs were declared. As at the cut-off date of this report, of these 26 CWPFs: eight mobile units had been destroyed and verified; at one CWPF, all declared specialized buildings and equipment had been destroyed and verified; at four CWPFs, all declared specialized/standard buildings and equipment had been destroyed but verification was pending; and at 13 CWPFs, either standard equipment and/or specialized/standard buildings remained to be destroyed and verified;

(d) Pursuant to paragraph 9 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic was required to submit, not later than 1 January 2014, for review by the Council not later than 15 January 2014, its plan for destroying, on its territory, isopropanol and residual mustard agent in containers previously containing mustard agent. The plan (EC-M-38/P/NAT.1, dated 14 January 2014) was noted by the Council at its Thirty-Eighth Meeting on 30 January 2014, at which meeting the Council also adopted a decision on verification measures for the destruction of isopropanol (EC-M-38/DEC.2, dated 30 January 2014). On 6 February 2014, the Syrian authorities submitted an amendment to the initial declaration correcting the amount of isopropanol declared. Subsequently, on 13 February 2014, the Syrian authorities submitted to the Secretariat information on the destruction of 93% of the declared amount of isopropanol. In the monthly report EC-M-39/P/NAT.1 (dated 18 February 2014), the Syrian Arab Republic indicated that the remaining amount of isopropanol will be destroyed as soon as circumstances permit access to the storage facility; and

(e) Pursuant to paragraph 19 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic is required to submit a monthly report to the Council regarding activities on its

territory related to the destruction of chemical weapons and CWPFs. The third such report was submitted to the Secretariat on 18 February 2014 and made available to the Council (EC-M-39/P/NAT.1).

5. In accordance with subparagraph 1 (e) of EC-M-33/DEC.1 and paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with all aspects of the implementation of the decision and the resolution. The Syrian authorities have continued to extend the necessary cooperation to the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (hereinafter "the Joint Mission") in the conduct of its activities during the reporting period. On 5 February 2014, the OPCW and the United Nations concluded an agreement concerning the status of the Joint Mission with the Syrian Government as required by United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). A memorandum of understanding for the provision of medical services and emergency medical evacuation services was signed at the same time.

Activities carried out by the Secretariat with respect to the Syrian Arab Republic

6. Effective cooperation with the United Nations in the context of the Joint Mission has continued with close coordination between the two organizations and between the offices in New York, The Hague, Cyprus and Damascus. As at the cut-off date of this report, 16 OPCW staff members were deployed with the Joint Mission in Damascus and Latakia, and one logistics officer in Beirut.

7. The Director-General and the Special Coordinator of the joint Mission, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, have maintained regular contact. The Special Coordinator briefed States Parties at OPCW Headquarters on 7 February 2014. The Director-General has continued to meet with senior representatives of the States Parties offering to host a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction, and to communicate regularly with senior officials from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 12 February 2014, the Director-General met with a visiting delegation from the Syrian Arab Republic. The Secretariat has continued to provide weekly information briefings to States Parties in The Hague.

8. The Joint Mission verified the packing and loading of chemicals, prior to their transportation to the port of embarkation at Latakia. On 27 January 2014, for security reasons, the physical presence of inspectors at the relevant CWSFs was not possible and remote verification was therefore undertaken instead, with a full inventory being conducted at the port. The physical presence of inspectors was possible for the movement on 10 February 2014, and activities at the relevant CWSFs included verifying the chemicals against the initial declaration, taking an inventory of the chemicals loaded into each shipping container, conducting sampling on a random basis, and sealing the containers. Upon the arrival of the containers at Latakia, the inventory documents for each shipping container were checked, the integrity of the seals was confirmed, and the contents of the containers were verified on a random basis. Once the containers were securely loaded on board the cargo ships, they returned to international waters, where, along with the naval escorts, they will await further deliveries of chemicals to Latakia.

9. The Joint Mission also conducted inspections at several CWSFs to verify the destruction of isopropanol carried out by Syrian personnel as reported in subparagraph 4 (d) above. As at the cut-off date of this report, the destruction of 93% of the total declared quantity of isopropanol had been verified in accordance

with the verification measures contained in EC-M-38/DEC.2. In addition, the Joint Mission has verified as destroyed 87% of containers previously containing mustard agent. The remaining quantity of isopropanol and the remaining containers are at locations that are currently assessed as being inaccessible for security reasons. Decanting of certain chemicals into new storage containers, suitable for transportation, was also verified at several CWSFs, in preparation for their onward transportation to the port of embarkation.

10. On 6 February 2014, representatives of the Secretariat participated in a preparatory meeting at the Italian port of Gioia Tauro, which is where chemicals will be transloaded from the Danish cargo ship onto the United States vessel, the *MV Cape Ray*, for eventual destruction. At the port, discussions were also held with the representatives of local agencies involved in the operation, as well as representatives of Denmark, Italy and the United States of America.

11. Following a rigorous solicitation process, on 14 February 2014 the Director-General announced that contracts for transport, treatment, and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and inorganic chemicals, effluents, and related materials with respect to the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons had been awarded to Ekokem Oy Ab from Finland and Veolia Environmental Services Technical Solutions, LLC from the United States of America. As previously reported, in response to the call for proposals that had been issued on 20 December 2013, 14 bids had been received by the deadline of 19 January 2014. Qualifying bids underwent a thorough process of technical and commercial evaluation before the preferred companies were selected for award of the contract by the Director-General. The conclusion of the solicitation process represents an important step towards the complete destruction of Syrian chemical weapons outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

12. On 14 February 2014, consultations were held with the Syrian Arab Republic with respect to the destruction of 12 declared Syrian CWPFs.

13. Informal consultations have been conducted on a model agreement specifying the arrangements governing on-site inspections at commercial facilities selected pursuant to paragraph 24 of decision EC-M-34/DEC.1 or sponsored by States Parties pursuant to paragraph 7 of decision EC-M-36/DEC.2. The model agreement was approved by the Council at its Thirty-Eighth Meeting (EC-M-38/DEC.1, dated 30 January 2014). The Secretariat has initiated negotiations on such an agreement with the two States Parties hosting the commercial facilities selected as a result of the solicitation process described in paragraph 11 above, with the model agreement serving as a basis for these negotiations. The model agreement will also serve as the basis for agreements with the Governments of Germany and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of the commercial facilities directly sponsored by these States Parties and which will destroy certain chemicals as part of their in-kind contributions.

14. As reported previously, the Secretariat, as required by paragraph 13 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, has developed a draft facility agreement for Syrian CWSFs and submitted the draft to the Syrian authorities for their comments.

Supplementary resources

15. As reported in the previous monthly report, several States Parties are providing assistance and resources for the purposes of the transportation, removal, and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. All equipment requested by the Syrian Arab Republic has now been provided, either through the Joint Mission or under bilateral arrangements. On 13 February 2014, the *MV Cape Ray* arrived in the region. Along with the outcome of the solicitation process described in paragraph 11 above, these developments mean that all the elements necessary for the removal of chemical weapons from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic and their subsequent destruction are now in place.

16. As at the cut-off date of this report, the balance in the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons stood at EUR 16 million. Contributions have been received from Australia, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. This includes the contributions that were originally made to the first OPCW Trust Fund for Syria and which have, at the request of the donor, subsequently been transferred, in part or in whole, to the Syria Trust Fund for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. Further contributions of EUR 2 million and approximately EUR 350,000 are expected from Italy and the Republic of Korea respectively. In addition, on 23 January 2014, an agreement was signed with India for a voluntary contribution of approximately EUR 736,000. On 24 January 2014, the Government of Canada announced a voluntary contribution of approximately EUR 6.6 million, part of a line of support that includes another CAD 5 million to support destruction operations aboard the United States vessel *MV Cape Ray*. On 17 February 2014, the Director-General travelled to Brussels to sign an agreement for a voluntary contribution of EUR 12 million by the European Union. The Japanese Government has decided to contribute USD 18 million (approximately EUR 13.2 million) jointly to the OPCW and the United Nations.

Conclusion

17. The Syrian Arab Republic has reaffirmed its commitment to the elimination of its chemical weapons programme in a timely manner. All the elements of the removal and destruction plan, including additional security equipment that the Syrian Arab Republic had considered essential and armour jackets for protection of the ISO containers, are now in place. It should therefore be possible to begin immediately the process of removal of chemicals in earnest through a cascade of activities that should yield significant and sustained movements.

United Nations A/68/776–S/2014/134

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
3 March 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 27 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that, at 2220 hours on 24 February 2014, Israeli military aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, raiding the outskirts of Janta town and firing several missiles within Lebanese territory. That clear act of aggression violates the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of international law and international norms, and Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

I reiterate my Government's commitment to international resolutions. I call upon the Security Council to condemn this attack in the strongest possible terms and prevail on Israel to bring an end to its violations of Lebanese sovereignty by air, sea and land, and fulfil all of its obligations under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations A/ES-10/618–S/2014/135

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
28 February 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 27 February 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I regret to inform you of the further escalation of tensions and deterioration of the situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, due to the incessant, systematic brutality and aggression by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people.

Today, the Israeli occupying forces killed another young Palestinian man in a military raid in the pre-dawn hours in the town of Bir Zeit north of Ramallah. Mo'taz Washaha, age 24, was brutally killed in the raid when the occupying forces besieged the home for approximately six hours and then began arbitrarily firing on it with heavy weaponry, including artillery shells. The occupying forces claimed that the intention was to once again arrest Washaha, who had been previously imprisoned by Israel. The manner in which this young man was violently pursued and attacked indicates a wilful intention to kill by the occupying forces. Moreover, it is yet another testament to the pervasive insecurity and abnormality of life for the Palestinian people, particularly Palestinian males, under Israel's occupation, including those who have suffered Israeli imprisonment and detention and the abuses and torture rampant in captivity and must live in constant fear of repeated arrest and violence by the Israeli occupying forces.

Such brutality by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian civilian population is being perpetrated in grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention and human rights law. The legal obligation to ensure the protection of civilians is being deliberately and systematically violated by Israel, as it continues its military attacks and excessive use of force against unarmed, defenceless civilians throughout the cities, towns, villages and refugee camps of Occupied Palestine, exhibiting a cruel disregard for human life and inflicting civilian casualties and widespread suffering and trauma, including among children and youth, women and elderly

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persons. Since the resumption of peace negotiations in July 2013, the Israeli occupying forces have killed 44 Palestinians and injured hundreds of other civilians and have carried out more than 3,360 military raids, including air strikes against the besieged Gaza Strip. Moreover, the Palestinian people continue to endure other human rights violations and crimes at the hands of the occupying Power, including, but not limited to, the confiscation and colonization of their land, the destruction of their homes and properties, forced displacement, imprisonment and administrative detention, physical and psychological abuse and torture, settler terrorism, exploitation and all means of collective punishment.

Even the right to peaceful protest and non-violent resistance to the occupation are being violently suppressed by the Israeli occupying forces, with routine attacks perpetrated against civilian demonstrators. In recent days, dozens of Palestinians have sustained injuries due to such excessive force. This includes attacks today on a protest in Al-Khalil, where the occupying forces shot rubber-coated steel bullets and tear gas canisters at civilian protesters, the injury of several Palestinians in a raid today in Nablus, and the injury of at least 13 Palestinians yesterday in Al-Khalil in a protest marking the twentieth anniversary of the massacre committed by an Israeli settler against Palestinian worshippers at Al-Ibrahimi Mosque, an act of terror that the Security Council rightly condemned in its resolution 904 (1994). Also, this week, yet another Palestinian man died in Israeli detention. Jihad Abdelrahman Al-Taweel, age 47, died on 24 February 2014, as a result of critical injuries sustained in an assault by Israeli prison guards earlier this month.

In this connection, we draw attention to a new report by the human rights organization Amnesty International and its findings that the Israeli occupying forces routinely use unnecessary, arbitrary and brutal force against the Palestinian civilian population, constituting a clear pattern of unlawful killings and injuries that appear to be a matter of policy. Further, as concluded in the report, "such arbitrary and abusive use of force contravenes policing standards that protect the right to life and other human rights and they also violate international humanitarian law applicable in territories under foreign military occupation, including the West Bank".

The international community must view such human rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law by Israel, the occupying Power, with utmost seriousness, as they are aggravating tensions, worsening the fragile situation on the ground and imposing severe hardship on the Palestinian people. The persistence of this unlawful behaviour also reconfirms the deep doubts among many regarding Israel's claimed commitment to peace, indicating that Israel is actually not interested in ending its nearly 47-year occupation. Moreover, such actions allude to an intention by Israel to provoke and incite against the Palestinian people, their leadership, their land and their holy places, particularly Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Occupied East Jerusalem, until it completely destabilizes the situation and sabotages the peace efforts being exerted by the United States, with the support of the League of Arab States, the Quartet and the international community as a whole.

The international community, particularly the Security Council, has a responsibility to address this critical situation in order to avert a further escalation and salvage the prospects for a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which remains a threat to international peace and security. Here, it must be stressed that the existence of peace negotiations does not absolve the Security Council of its Charter responsibilities and role in this regard. Israeli violations must be condemned

and it must be demanded of the occupying Power that it cease all of its violations and crimes against the Palestinian people. To remain silent in the face of such gross violations is unacceptable and will only bolster Israel's impunity and further delay the realization of a just and lasting peace and an end to the human suffering caused by this prolonged, tragic conflict.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 486 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which constitutes the territory of the State of Palestine. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 25 February 2014 (A/ES-10/617-S/2014/128) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations being committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feda **Abdelhady-Nasser**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2014/136

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 February 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Due to the deterioration of the situation in the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, Ukraine, which threatens the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and upon the relevant instruction of my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United Nations.

I also have the honour to request that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a representative of the Government of Ukraine be allowed to participate in the meeting and to make a statement.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Sergeyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations S/2014/137

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 March 2014

Original: English

Australia, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous statements and resolutions on the situation in Somalia, in particular its resolutions 2036 (2012), 2093 (2013), and 2111 (2013),

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Noting the Federal Government of Somalia's 6 February 2014 letter to the Security Council, *welcoming* the new information it provides as well as noting its shortcomings, *further noting* the National Security Adviser to the Federal Government of Somalia's 20 February letter to the Chair of the Committee, and *encouraging* it to continue to submit appropriately detailed information to the Security Council,

Welcoming the measures taken by the Federal Government of Somalia to manage better its weapons and ammunition, and *looking forward* to the Federal Government of Somalia taking further steps to improve its weapons management further,

Underlining the imperative need for the Federal Government of Somalia to improve its compliance with its requirements under the partial suspension of the arms embargo,

Taking note of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group's (SEMG) 6 February 2014 report on compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with its requirements under the terms of the partial suspension of the arms embargo on the Federal Government of Somalia,

Condemning flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, as well as the destabilizing accumulation and misuse of such weapons, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region,

Expressing serious concern that the requirements under the suspension of the arms embargo as set out in resolution 2093 (2013) and 2111 (2013) have not been fully met,

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Noting with concern the SEMG's reports of diversions of arms and ammunition, including to Al-Shabaab, which has been cited as a potential recipient of diverted arms and ammunition, and *further noting* that, pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1844 (2008), all Member States are required to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of weapons and military equipment to designated individuals and entities, which includes Al-Shabaab,

Stressing that any decision to continue or end the partial suspension of the arms embargo on the Federal Government of Somalia will be taken in the light of the thoroughness of the Federal Government of Somalia's implementation of its requirements as set out in this and other relevant Security Council resolutions,

Noting the request of the Federal Government of Somalia for assistance in weapons management, and *encouraging* relevant international actors, including the United Nations, to support the Federal Government of Somalia in managing weapons and military equipment in an effective manner,

Reiterating the need for all Member States to respect and implement, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, their obligations with respect to preventing unauthorized deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia and to prevent the direct or indirect import of charcoal from Somalia in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions,

Recalling the Informal Working Group on General issues of Sanctions report (S/2006/997) on best practices and methods, including paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 that discuss possible steps for clarifying methodological standards for monitoring mechanisms,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* the arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraphs 4 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013);

2. *Decides* that until 25 October 2014 the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to deliveries of the items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013);

3. *Decides* that the Federal Government of Somalia has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) (the Committee) for its information at least five days in advance of any deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training to its Security Forces, as permitted in paragraph 2 of this resolution, as well as for the exemption procedure for those items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013), as provided for by paragraph 7 of resolution 2111 (2013);

4. *Decides* that the Member State, international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance may, in the alternative, make the notification referred to in paragraph 3 in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia;

5. *Decides* that all such notifications concerning the provision of weapons or military equipment to the Committee shall include: details of the manufacturer and supplier of the arms and ammunition, a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces, or the intended place of storage;

6. *Further decides* that, no later than 30 days after the delivery of arms or ammunition, the Federal Government of Somalia shall submit to the Committee a written confirmation of the completion of the delivery, including the serial numbers for the arms and ammunition delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage, and *recognizes* the value of the supplying Member State, international, regional or subregional organization doing the same, in cooperation with the Federal Government of Somalia;

7. *Further decides* that within five days of the distribution of imported arms or ammunition, the Federal Government of Somalia shall inform the Committee in writing of the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or the place of storage;

8. *Reiterates* that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and *underlines* the responsibility of the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles;

9. *Requests* the Federal Government of Somalia to report to the Security Council by 13 June 2014 and again by 13 September 2014 on:

(a) The structure, strength and composition (including the status of allied militia) of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, including the names of current commanders, the locations of the headquarters, and the status of militias;

(b) The infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of military equipment by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, including details of all available armouries and storerooms, their location, storage capacity, staffing capacity, arms and ammunition management systems and status of use;

(c) The procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons by the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and on training needs in this regard, including procedures for receipt, verification and recording of weapons imports through any Federal Government controlled port of entry, procedures for the transport of weapons and ammunition with the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and the current systems of logging and auditing in the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide options and recommendations, within 30 days, on United Nations (including UNSOM) and other technical assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia in:

(a) Complying with its requirements as set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 of this resolution and with the requests set out in paragraph 9 of this resolution;

(b) Assisting in improving its capacities in the safe and transparent storage, distribution and management of weapons and military equipment, including in monitoring and verification;

11. *Urges* the Federal Government of Somalia, all other parties and States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, including AMISOM, to ensure cooperation with the Monitoring Group, and ensure the safety of the members of the Monitoring Group, unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites the Monitoring Group deems relevant to the execution of its mandate;

12. *Requests* the SEMG to provide the Federal Government of Somalia feedback on its reporting to the Committee and to keep the Security Council regularly informed on compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia with this and other relevant Council resolutions;

13. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Special report of the Secretary-General on the review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. Six years after the transition from the African Union Mission in the Sudan to the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), a comprehensive political settlement to the Darfur crisis has yet to be reached. Fighting continues and protection and humanitarian assistance needs among the civilian population remain considerable. Further compounding the situation, intercommunal conflict has intensified, especially over resources, since August 2012. At the same time, humanitarian space continues to be challenged and UNAMID itself has been subject to increasingly hostile action. In 2013, UNAMID suffered 19 attacks, resulting in 16 dead and 27 injured and a significant loss of vehicles, weapons and ammunition. In that context, the Security Council requested in its resolution 2113 (2013) a detailed and forward-looking review of the Mission's progress towards achieving its mandate, particularly in the light of major changes and developments in the situation in Darfur since the Mission's establishment.

2. A joint assessment team, consisting of representatives from the African Union Commission, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support of the Secretariat, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme and UNAMID, undertook the review in close consultation with the United Nations country team in the Sudan. The review was conducted in three phases, the first of which involved an updated analysis of the causes, drivers and effects of conflict in Darfur. In the second phase, the Mission's existing capacities and strategies were evaluated, taking into account the operating environment. In the third phase, the assessment team reviewed the strategic priorities for UNAMID and developed recommendations to address the main challenges to the implementation of the mandate.

II. Conflict analysis

3. The conflict in Darfur continues to take place within the context of pre-existing root causes that include the loss or severe disruption of traditional livelihoods, weakened traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, impunity and weak rule of law, weak or absent State administrations in rural areas, the prevalence

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of arms and armed militias, a lack of trust between and within communities, the manipulation of social divisions and cycles of retaliatory violence. Those drivers have been further intensified by long-term demographic and climate change, including urbanization and drought. In addition, new elements, elaborated below, have influenced conflict dynamics in Darfur, leading to a considerable deterioration of the security situation during 2013.

Centre-periphery dynamics

4. Grievances related to the political and economic marginalization of Darfur by Khartoum continue to fuel the armed rebellion. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)-Jibril Ibrahim, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Abdul Wahid and SLA-Minni Minawi are the Government's main adversaries in that regard. That aspect of the conflict took on a new dimension following the secession of South Sudan in July 2011, when similar grievances reignited rebellions in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)-North. In November 2011, all four rebel movements united to form the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). That marked, for the first time since fighting ended between the Government of the Sudan and SPLM, in January 2005, the coming together of several armed groups in the "peripheries" of the Sudan for the stated cause of a more equitable share of power and wealth.

5. While Government and armed movement forces have continued to clash sporadically inside Darfur, the formation of the SRF shifted the focus of the armed opposition's operations to areas beyond Darfur. Armed clashes outside Darfur now adversely affect stability within Darfur (and vice versa), as raids are carried out by movements within Darfur to obtain supplies for operations on other fronts.

6. The establishment of the SRF also led to the adoption by the Darfur armed movements of a national political agenda. That agenda is set out in the "New Dawn Charter", a political platform adopted by SRF in January 2013. Among other things, it calls for a holistic (i.e., national) as opposed to piecemeal (i.e., regional) approach to resolving the multiple conflicts within the Sudan, arguing that the underlying causes of each stem from a set of common issues. Since entering the alliance, the Darfur armed movements have presented that argument as a precondition for negotiations with the Government. Conversely, the Government's position is that the conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, which it characterizes as symptoms of unresolved issues related to implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, must be dealt with separately from negotiations over Darfur. Further, it insists that negotiations concerning Darfur be based on the Darfur-specific Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. The parties cite this divergence of views as a key obstacle to negotiations over a political settlement. The announcement by President Bashir on 27 January 2014 of a national dialogue presents an opportunity in that respect, and the modalities of such a dialogue deserve to be explored to address the legitimate grievances of the people of Darfur.

Intensification of intercommunal conflict

7. With regard to other new conflict dynamics, a marked deterioration in the economy of the Sudan following the secession of South Sudan in July 2011 seriously undermined security in Darfur. The Sudan lost three quarters of its oil production as a result, which, according to the International Monetary Fund,

accounted for half its previous fiscal revenue and a third of its export proceeds. The subsequent 14-month cessation of oil production and transportation by South Sudan further exacerbated the situation. Those losses were compounded by other serious economic challenges, including unsustainable external debt, an annual budget deficit and bilateral economic sanctions. In addition, high military spending and disruptions to revenue collection in conflict-affected areas have further undermined economic growth and stability.

8. The effects in Darfur have been visible in increased fuel and basic commodity prices, a rise in criminal activity and heightened competition between communities for natural resources, in particular arable land and minerals. At the same time, the economic crisis is alleged to have constrained the Government's ability to finance the mainly pastoralist tribal militias from which it draws the paramilitary units that supplement its military operations. The resulting disruptions in salary payments have led elements of those units (the Popular Defence Forces, the Central Reserve Police and border guards) to seek alternative sources of revenue. That situation is considered to have precipitated their involvement, in support of tribal affiliates, in heavy intercommunal fighting over natural resources, in particular artisanal gold mines in Northern Darfur, a prospective oil field in Eastern Darfur and land in Central and Southern Darfur.

9. While resource-based clashes between communities, supported by tribal militias, have occurred in Darfur since long before the rebellion began in 2003, that dimension of the crisis has intensified significantly since the economic downturn in mid-2012, such that it has eclipsed military clashes as the primary cause of violence against civilians and of population displacement. The escalation began in January 2013, when a dispute over control of an artisanal gold mine in Jebel Amir, Northern Darfur, triggered heavy fighting, supported by paramilitary elements, between groups from the northern Rezeigat and Beni Hussein tribes. The clashes led to the displacement of approximately 100,000 civilians, a substantial increase in humanitarian assistance needs and major disruptions to livelihood activities. Six major outbreaks of resource-based intercommunal fighting followed in 2013, which, along with sporadic clashes between Government and armed movement forces, displaced an additional 400,000 civilians.

Effects on the civilian population

10. The fighting in Darfur continues to have a highly deleterious effect on civilians. After 11 years of fighting between Government and armed movement forces, together with the recent trends towards increased criminal activity and intercommunal conflict, Darfur remains one of the world's largest humanitarian crises. In 2013, the humanitarian situation deteriorated significantly in many areas as an estimated 400,000 people were forced to flee new outbreaks of fighting. The total number of internally displaced people increased to almost two million. Protracted displacement, food insecurity and a lack of basic services continue to drive chronic vulnerability in all five Darfur states. Overall, a total of 3.5 million people are currently targeted for humanitarian assistance. The deprivation, displacement and limited access to basic social services are both symptoms and drivers of conflict. The protracted violence has destroyed or had a severe impact on the economic livelihoods of almost all Darfuris. The destruction of homes, markets and food sources, the displacement of rural communities into urban settings and the disruption of transport infrastructure for trade have significantly affected much of

the population. Clashes and the resulting population displacements have severely disrupted transhumance routes and pastoralist production patterns.

11. Protection assessments conducted in conflict-affected areas during 2013 noted serious concerns related to civilian casualties, sexual and gender-based violence, the separation of families, the recruitment of children into armed groups, violence against children and the targeting of civilians in transit camps or temporary settlements. Moreover, assaults, sexual and gender-based violence and looting take place within an overall climate of impunity.

III. Analysis of the capacities of UNAMID

12. Based on the updated conflict analysis, the review team evaluated the Mission's existing capacities and impact, taking into account the evolving operating environment and challenges.

Protection of civilians and ensuring unhindered humanitarian access

13. UNAMID contributes to the protection of civilians through, among other things, various types of patrols, static security and the promotion of community policing, particularly in camps for internally displaced persons. The Mission facilitates the medical evacuation of wounded civilians from insecure areas, provides security for local community mediation and contributes to area security through confidence-building patrols. Additional contributions include support in preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence, the protection of human rights, child protection and addressing the risks posed by the explosive remnants of war. The Mission facilitates the delivery of humanitarian assistance by aid agencies by providing escorts and logistical support, contributing to area security and ensuring the safety and security of aid personnel and their property.

14. While UNAMID is having some impact in those areas, its effectiveness is seriously constrained by access restrictions and mobility constraints and shortfalls in the operational capabilities of several troop and police contingents. An example of the Mission's positive impact includes the timely establishment in 2013 of a temporary operating base in El Sireaf, Northern Darfur, that enhanced protection and enabled humanitarian actors to deliver aid to approximately 60,000 civilians who had been displaced by heavy intercommunal fighting. With regard to the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, the United Nations country team agencies called for UNAMID troops to adopt a more robust posture when faced with restrictions of movement to crisis-affected areas. Supporting that analysis, the review also noted a need for improved planning, prioritization and coordination between Mission components and between the Mission and humanitarian actors.

Support to the political process

15. The framework for African Union and United Nations facilitation of the Darfur peace process of 2012 (see S/2012/166) guides the Mission's work to increase the inclusiveness of the political process. That framework, endorsed by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council, is built on the following three pillars, which are to be pursued simultaneously: (1) support to the signatory parties with regard to the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, (2) engagement with the Government and Darfur armed movements to

promote negotiations and (3) support for Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations. The ability of UNAMID to facilitate progress in the first area has been limited by delays in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur by the signatory parties (the Government of the Sudan, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and JEM-Bashar) and the absence of an inclusive political settlement between the Government and non-signatory movements. While implementation of the power-sharing aspects of the agreement has led to the inclusion of LJM and JEM-Bashar personnel in the various levels of government, in particular in the Darfur Regional Authority, the degree to which they have been able to govern effectively and inclusively has been constrained by a lack of capacity, resources and political influence.

16. With regard to reaching an inclusive settlement to the conflict, there remains a divergence of views between the parties over whether the talks should be national or regional in scope. In addition, the lack of unified pressure on the parties from the international community continues to hamper the efforts of the African Union and United Nations Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, to promote negotiations between the Government and armed movements. In that connection, the Joint Chief Mediator has intensified his engagement with key regional actors to solicit their support for the talks. In addition, he coordinates with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan to synchronize efforts to address conflicts in Darfur and Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States.

17. The Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations provided for in the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, if safe, credible and broadly inclusive, could make a meaningful contribution to increasing the inclusiveness of the peace process at the local level. That initiative, which UNAMID is mandated to support, is scheduled to commence in the first half of 2014. The national, state and local elections planned for 2015 could offer another opportunity to increase the inclusiveness of and representation in the Government, provided those elections are free and fair. The constitutional review process, as proposed by the Government, would provide another means through which to address conflict factors related to political marginalization and exclusion, if it is broadly inclusive, transparent and credible.

Facilitating recovery and supporting local dispute resolution

18. The weakness of local dispute resolution mechanisms is another major contributor to the intensification of intercommunal conflict. In that connection, UNAMID has stepped up its support to local mediation efforts between communities, including through the transportation of officials and influential community leaders to "hot spots" for reconciliation meetings, the building of the capacity of local authorities and traditional mediators to resolve conflict and the promotion of dialogue between conflicting parties. That assistance has contributed greatly to peaceful dialogue that in almost all cases has led to local cessation of hostilities agreements. In 2013 alone, conflicting parties entered into a total of 15 local cessation of hostilities agreements. While several of the agreements subsequently broke down, owing to a lack of attention by the parties in addressing the resource-related root causes of the conflicts, the accords nevertheless provided lulls in the fighting that allowed for the provision of assistance to civilians and the increased engagement of local mediators. The review found that the Mission's

engagement in that priority area is having a positive impact, although it is limited by the absence of an inclusive political settlement.

19. The inequitable management of access to natural resources is another key cause of intercommunal fighting. In that connection, the Darfur Development Strategy, formulated by the Darfur Regional Authority and international partners in November 2012, provides a framework for addressing the resource-related drivers of conflict, as well as recovery, development and poverty eradication needs more broadly. However, the transfer of funds from the federal Government to the Darfur Regional Authority to enable the Strategy's execution is lagging far behind the implementation timetable of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur ($165 million of the $500 million currently due has been transferred). In addition, donors have yet to fulfil their contributions to the $1 billion pledged at a conference in Doha in April 2013. Within its limited means, the Darfur Regional Authority is in the process of commencing 315 development projects in the areas of health, education and water as at December 2013 (funded from the $165 million received thus far). Other development activities include the ongoing construction of Qatari-funded "model villages" throughout Darfur to promote population return. Those efforts notwithstanding, the recovery and reconstruction needs of Darfur remain massive. Without the increased commitment of resources and political will by the signatory parties, as well as donors, making progress in this area will remain challenging for the Darfur Regional Authority and the United Nations country team.

Strengthening the rule of law, human rights and arms control

20. Grievances related to weak rule of law, human rights violations and the prevalence of arms and armed groups remain major drivers of conflict and instability in Darfur. The Mission works to strengthen the rule of law and increase access to justice by rehabilitating court facilities, transporting judges to rural areas for "mobile court" hearings and training traditional community leaders. In addition, UNAMID collaborates with UNDP to provide legal assistance to pre-trial detainees. The maintenance of emergency and national security laws that allow the authorities to arrest and detain citizens without charge for prolonged periods severely limits the development of the judicial sector even when support has been provided within the framework of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

21. The Mission, in conjunction with UNDP, has strengthened the corrections system and improved conditions in prisons managed by the Ministry of the Interior. In December 2013, the Government launched a five-year strategic plan to further develop, with the support of UNAMID and UNDP, prisons and the capacity of corrections staff. However, UNAMID is not allowed access to facilities managed by the National Intelligence and Security Services or the Sudanese Armed Forces. While there has been good progress made in improving the welfare of prisoners where UNAMID has access, there is a need for commensurate progress in the reform of the judicial system to ensure such efforts are more closely linked to the Mission's overall conflict resolution and stabilization objectives.

22. UNAMID works to address grievances related to criminal accountability through, inter alia, training and building the capacity of Government police, promoting community policing, in particular in camps for internally displaced persons, and various types of police patrols. The work of the police component in that area is constrained by an insufficient number of officers with the special skills

needed to meet the specific capacity-building needs of Government police, including in the areas of crime scene analysis, forensics, human trafficking, information technology and transnational crime. The Mission has developed closer working relations with the Ministry of the Interior, including through the signing of a memorandum of understanding in August 2013 on cooperation and capacity-building. Furthermore, a joint UNAMID and United Nations country team working group was recently formed to enhance collaboration. Overall, the review found that an analysis of the impact of the Mission's work in that area is in need of strengthening.

23. The Mission's efforts to help address grievances arising from human rights violations and abuses involve monitoring, reporting and advocating for greater respect for such rights. Insufficient cooperation by the Government, particularly in terms of access, seriously constrains the Mission's ability to carry out those tasks, especially when it comes to verifying and reporting on alleged violations and abuses in a timely manner, advocating for corrective action and contributing to an early warning system. Nevertheless, while not easily quantifiable, the Mission's work has had some impact on raising awareness and promoting respect for human rights, including through the holding of workshops for civil society organizations, which themselves face major constraints. In addition, of late the authorities have shown increased interest in receiving capacity-building support from UNAMID, including assistance in participating in international human rights courses and training.

24. The Mission supports arms control by providing technical advice to the authorities and armed movements, including those engaged in the mediation process, on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration planning and security arrangements. It also provides technical advice on regional arms control measures to the Government of the Sudan, including on the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur regarding the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of LJM and JEM-Bashar combatants. Meanwhile, in an effort to offer alternative opportunities to youth who are at risk of joining armed groups or gangs, UNAMID supports the implementation of community-based, labour-intensive programmes to equip them with vocational skills. A total of 5,000 youth have participated in the initiative since its inception in July 2011. Surveys conducted by the Mission at the end of the training show a marked increase in their employment prospects and a reduced inclination to join armed groups or gangs.

IV. Key challenges to effective operations

25. In the light of the political and security environment in Darfur, the review identified three major challenges faced by UNAMID in the effective discharge of its mandate: (1) the cooperation and partnership of the Government in mandate implementation, (2) major shortfalls in several troop- and police-contingent capabilities and (3) the need for improved coordination and integration structures within the Mission and between the Mission and the United Nations country team.

Cooperation by the host Government

26. While cooperation with UNAMID by the host Government has improved with regard to the issuance of visas, restrictions of access and delays in the issuance of customs clearances for contingent-owned equipment continue and significantly

undermine the Mission's effectiveness. Access restrictions have three dimensions: (1) the denial of access to areas in crisis when required by the Mission and humanitarian actors, (2) the halting of patrols at checkpoints and (3) denials or delays relating to travel permits for the United Nations country team.

27. The authorities typically restrict access to areas in crisis in the early stages. The restrictions then tend to decrease after three to five weeks. While the number of restrictions imposed on the Mission's movements are small relative to the total number of patrols conducted, their impact is significant because they tend to occur in situations where protection and humanitarian assistance needs are acute. With regard to the halting of patrols at checkpoints, it was recognized that responsibility sometimes lies with Mission personnel who too easily turn back rather than assertively insisting on proceeding.

28. Humanitarian actors face particular restrictions that constrain and delay the delivery of assistance, which take the form of denials of access, delays in the issuance of staff work permits and the cancellation of field missions, particularly in the context of new emergencies. Access often varies significantly according to geographical location, assisting organization, sector and prevailing security situation. Access to areas of active fighting is generally not possible and includes the East Jebel Marra region, where an estimated 100,000 people have been cut off from United Nations assistance since early 2010. The restrictions affect the capacity of humanitarian actors to assess needs, implement projects, monitor impacts and consult with affected people. Those effects are compounded by the reduced availability of funding for humanitarian actors (the Consolidated Appeal for South Sudan in 2013 was less than 60 per cent funded) which reduces the humanitarian presence in Darfur, despite the deteriorating humanitarian situation. Despite those challenges, the United Nations and partners reached at least three million people with humanitarian assistance in 2013.

29. Delays by the authorities in the issuance of customs clearances for contingent-owned equipment have constrained the force by hindering the deployment of units and creating gaps in the force configuration. At the time of writing, clearances had been pending for an infantry reserve unit and a military utility helicopter unit since July and November 2013, respectively. Those delays prevent the force from reaching its full strength and effectiveness.

30. Over the last year, cooperation between the Mission and the Government of the Sudan, including the timelier issuance of visas, has resulted in improvements in mandate implementation. That indicates that more progress may be possible, including with regard to access, through the building of working relations with the authorities from team sites to the national level.

Troop- and police-contingent capabilities

31. The review identified shortfalls in the operational capabilities of the Mission's military and police components as another key challenge to effective mandate implementation, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians and ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Those shortfalls seriously constrain the force's mobility, effectiveness and ability to deter attacks. They pertain mainly to force mobility constraints; deficiencies in the contingent-owned equipment, training and readiness of some contingents; and the need for improved planning and coordination

between Mission components (military, police and civilian) and between the Mission and humanitarian actors.

32. The review team assessed the force's mandated strength and capabilities as adequate and necessary for the operational environment. However, the actual capabilities of several contingents on the ground fall well below operational requirements. As at 28 February 2013, 20 of the 27 military units deployed to UNAMID have major equipment serviceability rates below 90 per cent, and 5 units are at or below 44 per cent. The deficiencies pertain mainly to the serviceability of armoured personnel carriers. Of the 17 formed police units deployed to UNAMID, 5 also fall well below operational requirements: one armoured personnel carrier unit has a serviceability rate of 50 per cent, another has a rate of 20 per cent and three have a rate of 0 per cent. Steps are being taken by four of the units to urgently address the shortfalls. Repatriation and replacement of the remaining unit is under way.

33. In addition, several military contingents have yet to field the self-sustainment capabilities needed to establish temporary operating bases away from team sites. Others have not deployed with the authorized higher calibre weapons. In addition, a number of authorized military assets have yet to be deployed, including eight much-needed military utility helicopters. While the deployment of three helicopters is expected in the first half of 2014, five remain unpledged. The deployment of an infantry battalion and a reserve infantry unit are on hold pending the issuance of customs clearances for contingent-owned equipment.

34. Regarding the overall deployment of the force, the review noted that the reconfiguration carried out in line with the recommendations of the 2012 uniformed personnel review remain appropriate given the location of conflict incidents and potential flashpoints. Those adjustments saw the force reconfigured in such a manner that the infantry units are now mainly concentrated along a north-west to south-east axis through the centre of Darfur. In addition, the number of personnel deployed to more secure areas was reduced while still maintaining the overall force footprint. Because nearly half of all incidents occur more than 100 km from the nearest team site, however, there is a need for the force to more regularly and effectively project a presence through increased mobility, engage with the local population, protect civilians and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance over a commensurate range.

35. In addition, there is a need for the force to move from a routine and reactive posture to one that is preventive and pre-emptive. The force has taken some positive steps in that regard, but there is a need to maximize available resources in the Mission by improving coordination and synergy between military, police and civilian personnel. Patrolling must also be more closely linked to its intended purpose and effect, prioritized according to the population's protection needs and informed by joint planning and coordination between Mission components, in conjunction with humanitarian actors, at the team site level.

Mission coordination and integration structures

36. The Mission's effectiveness is also hampered by shortcomings in coordination structures within UNAMID and integrated assessment and planning between UNAMID and the United Nations country team. With regard to integration and coordination within UNAMID, the Mission would benefit from a clearer strategic

vision based on ongoing integrated analysis of the situation in Darfur, a set of priorities, a strategic and operational planning system mobilizing all resources around the defined priorities and a strong, integrated and timely reporting and analysis system that allows all key actors and decision makers to have a single picture of the short- and long-term developments in the area of operations. In addition, there is a need for UNAMID to more clearly define the impact of its work in the implementation of its mandate. A system is needed to more effectively monitor and evaluate its impact, particularly when it comes to the protection of civilians and ensuring unhindered humanitarian access. Further, the Mission should more effectively convey its achievements to the public, the United Nations Security Council, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Member States and the African Union and United Nations Headquarters. The review also found a strong need for the Mission to improve, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, its early warning and response mechanism, joint threat and risk analysis and the coordination of protection of civilian activities more generally.

37. With regard to cooperation between the Mission and the United Nations country team, there are several mechanisms for coordination or liaison. However, while most facilitate consultations and some information exchange, there is little joint decision-making on joint operational planning, the shared delivery of results and the evaluation of activities of common interest. The review found that, for the most part, the various UNAMID components and the United Nations country team are doing what they consider best to fulfil the parts of the mandate that fall within their areas of expertise. While there is some collaboration, the extent of that collaboration is generally more dependent upon the people involved than on effective and well-functioning systems of joint operational planning, coordination and evaluation. In that regard, there is a need to streamline and make more action-oriented the coordination mechanisms between the two entities so that they facilitate planning, joint action to deliver results and regular reporting and evaluation in line with the United Nations policy on integrated assessment and planning.

38. As far as the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in the hybrid peacekeeping operation is concerned, UNAMID is an unprecedented undertaking that brings with it several challenges and opportunities for both organizations. One of the challenges facing the United Nations Secretariat and the African Union Commission is the need to coordinate with one another on the provision of joint strategic guidance to UNAMID. The review found that the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism, based in Addis Ababa, performs important coordination, support and liaison functions effectively. The Mechanism also plays an important role in raising awareness and enhancing the engagement of the Peace and Security Council and African troop- and police-contributing countries in the situation in Darfur and UNAMID operations.

V. Strategic options and recommendations

Revised strategic priorities

39. The political environment in and around the Sudan has changed since the deployment of UNAMID. New conflict dynamics have emerged and old ones remain unaddressed. In that context, the Mission's strategic priorities in terms of mandate implementation need to be revised to reflect the changing environment and

to increase its effectiveness in creating a more secure environment for the population of Darfur.

40. Accordingly, three strategic priorities have been identified: (1) mediation between the Government and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, while taking into account ongoing transformation at the national level; (2) the protection of civilians, the facilitation of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; and (3) the provision of support, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, to the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes. The implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur relates to all three priorities, which need to be further defined on the basis of an integrated conflict assessment. Decision-making on Mission activities must be governed by those overarching priorities. Each is already provided for in the mandate authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 2113 (2013). The review found that the mandate remains appropriate for the requirements of peacekeeping operations in Darfur.

Options and recommendations for improving the Mission's effectiveness

41. The review concluded that there is a strong need and much potential for UNAMID to improve across the full spectrum of its work if the key challenges to mandate implementation are addressed. In that context, the review recommends a range of measures to improve the Mission's effectiveness in mandate implementation.

42. While the implementation of the recommended measures must happen quickly and as a matter of high priority, a period of time will be needed to allow them to take effect and for the changes to be realized. In addition, more time is needed for the Mission to fully adapt to and account for the new conflict dynamics and for the recent and extensive changes to the Mission leadership to take full effect. The review recommends that a period of one year following the Council's consideration of the findings be taken to implement the measures in order for the effects to be seen.

43. During that time, efforts to address troop- and police-contingent shortcomings would be redoubled so that the contingents fully meet the requirements set out in the memoranda of understanding. The assistance of Member States is vital in that regard. The African Union and United Nations Headquarters would increase their engagement with troop- and police-contributing countries and their support to UNAMID to help address the challenge. Improvements would lead to greater force mobility and an expanded patrol footprint. Guidance for troops and police in predeployment training and on convoy procedures, freedom of movement and ambush drills would be strengthened. Coordination between the military, police and civilian components and between the Mission and the United Nation country team would be enhanced, in particular at the team site level. Capacity-building requirements of Government police would be reviewed and UNAMID police officers with commensurate skills would be deployed, as appropriate.

44. The Government of the Sudan would be called upon to build on the recent improvements in cooperation with UNAMID with respect to implementation of the mandate. Support from the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Security Council would be requested to support host country partnership and

cooperation. Progress on that front would lead to more effective and increased support from the Mission for building the capacity of police, corrections and judicial institutions, as well as protection, including human rights monitoring. In the absence of improvements, such support would be of limited effectiveness and be reduced accordingly. Where freedom of movement to areas in crisis is denied, the Mission would immediately send a comprehensive report to the African Union and United Nations Headquarters immediately in order to ensure timely political engagement at all levels. Mission personnel would do more to develop the working relations needed to engage the authorities locally to address denials of access as and when they arise.

45. Gaps in the integrated strategic and operational architecture of the Mission would be addressed. To improve coordination between UNAMID and the United Nations country team and enable both to achieve more than the sum of their parts, the full requirements of the United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning would be put in place. That includes: (1) the articulation of a common United Nations (and African Union) vision, including priorities and respective responsibilities in support of peace consolidation; (2) the establishment of integrated mechanisms for joint analysis, planning, coordination, monitoring and decision-making; and (3) the development and implementation of an updated integrated strategic framework.

46. The Mission leadership and the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan, with the participation of the heads of agencies, funds and programmes, would address and review the planning and implementation of strategic work. The Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator would be the primary source of strategic advice to the Joint Special Representative on all matters relating to humanitarian assistance, recovery and development in Darfur.

47. The framework for African Union and United Nations facilitation of the Darfur peace process would continue to guide the Mission's efforts to increase the inclusiveness of the political process. The Joint Chief Mediator would continue to coordinate with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan to synchronize their mediation efforts, while also taking into account ongoing transformation at the national level. The United Nations Secretariat would assess separately, in consultation with the Government of the Sudan, the feasibility and appropriateness of providing United Nations support to national, state and local elections.

48. The findings and recommendations of the civilian staffing review requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/264 would be aligned with the revised strategic priorities and recommendations set out in the present report. Moreover, a joint vision and strategy to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of UNAMID and the work of the United Nations country team in support of the police, corrections and judicial systems would be developed through the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP global focal point arrangement. UNAMID would maintain a capacity to advise, in coordination with UNDP, the authorities and armed movements on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration planning, community arms control and regional arms control mechanisms. Additional capacity would be mobilized, should the circumstances dictate, to support the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of LJM, JEM-Bashar or other armed groups. The Mission would continue to oversee, in collaboration with UNDP where appropriate,

the implementation of community-based violence reduction projects for youth who are at risk of joining armed groups or gangs.

Monitoring mechanism

49. An effective system that would monitor and evaluate the Mission's effectiveness in terms of mandate implementation is required in order to better track the progress and measure the impact of its activities. The coordination of protection of civilian activities would be strengthened and an early warning and response mechanism established in conjunction with the United Nations country team. In that context, military and police patrols would be prioritized according to "must protect", "should protect" and "could protect" areas.

50. I propose that the benchmarks outlined in my report of 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771) be adjusted to reflect the revised strategic priorities of the Mission. That would provide a framework by which progress can be more meaningfully measured in accordance with the strategic priorities for peace in Darfur and with the Mission's mandate. The fulfilment of those priorities requires the commitment of all concerned, most notably the Government of the Sudan, local authorities and rebel and community leaders. For UNAMID and its contributors, progress requires attention to the operational and managerial challenges outlined in the present report. Reporting to the Security Council should be structured in accordance with the revised benchmarks, emphasizing the impact that the Mission's activities have in relation to each of the strategic priorities. The fulfilment of the benchmarks is not exclusively tied to the proposed 12-month period, however. I recognize that more time will be required. However, the measures taken to address the challenges facing UNAMID will enable the Mission to work more effectively with its partners in achieving them. As the situation evolves, the benchmarks will be refined as necessary. The proposed benchmarks, with progress indicators, can be found in the annex to the present report.

Scenarios

51. After one year, the Security Council would be faced with three scenarios:

(a) The political and security situation has not changed and the Mission has not improved its effectiveness, and a thorough assessment of the way forward requiring hard decisions on the future of UNAMID will be necessary;

(b) The political and security situation has not changed but the Mission has nevertheless measurably improved its effectiveness, and streamlining continues within the civilian and uniformed components based on effectiveness;

(c) The political and security situation has improved and the Mission has improved its effectiveness, in which case consideration should be given to strengthening, accordingly, the peacebuilding and support to early recovery mandate of the Mission.

VI. Conclusion

52. Eleven years since the rebellion began, the situation in Darfur remains deeply troubling. The updated conflict analysis in the present report describes how new dynamics have altered the nature of conflict in Darfur and significantly affected the

population. The assessment of existing Mission capacities points to a need for UNAMID to adjust in response to the changes. At the same time, the assessment highlights several key challenges that seriously constrain the Mission's operational effectiveness. I have therefore recommended a set of revised strategic priorities for the Mission and a range of measures to address those challenges over the course of a 12-month period in order to enable their implementation and allow their effects to be seen.

53. Taken together, the recommendations set out in the present report provide a plan for a redoubled effort by UNAMID, the African Union Commission, the United Nations Secretariat, troop- and police-contributing countries, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council to improve the Mission's effectiveness. I urge the members of the Security Council to support the recommendations as part of the collective effort to enable UNAMID to reach its full potential. Despite the many challenges facing the Mission, it is making much-needed contributions to the protection of civilians, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and supporting the political process. The review sees the potential for the Mission to have a greater impact. I call upon the members of the Security Council to endorse the recommendations in the present report so that UNAMID can more effectively assist the many civilians affected by violence, insecurity and deprivation in Darfur.

Annex I

Proposed adjustment of benchmarks

Benchmark 1: Inclusive peace process through mediation between the Government and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

Requirements for progress would include a commitment on the part of the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements to reach a comprehensive negotiated political settlement to the conflict and adhere to its full and timely implementation, and credible Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations that seek to reflect the views of the civilian population, including women, on Darfur in the peace process.

Indicators

High-level mediation:

- The Government and the non-signatory movements enter into direct negotiations brokered by the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator for Darfur over an all-inclusive comprehensive settlement to the Darfur conflict.
- The Government and the non-signatory movements conclude and observe a comprehensive and inclusive cessation of hostilities.
- The outcomes of the Darfur peace process are reflected in a national constitutional process supported by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for the Sudan, as provided for in the framework for African Union and United Nations facilitation of the Darfur peace process.

Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations:

- Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations take place in an inclusive and transparent environment that ensures the proportional representation of Darfuris and respect for the human rights of participants, as monitored by the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
- The outcomes of the Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultations are widely disseminated and implemented in a manner that promotes and consolidates peace and stability in Darfur.
- A functioning Darfur Regional Authority that oversees the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, in conjunction with the Government of the Sudan.

Benchmark 2: Protection of civilians and unhindered humanitarian access and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel

Requirements for progress would include the demonstrated commitment of the parties to the conflict, including Government forces, non-signatory movements and other armed groups, to cease hostilities and respect and implement ceasefire and security arrangements; the demonstrated commitment of the parties to the conflict to implement measures to protect civilians (or promote/respect human rights); the demonstrated commitment of the parties to the conflict to allow unrestricted

humanitarian access; the willingness of local actors to facilitate the safe, voluntary and sustainable return, reintegration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees; support by the international donor community for humanitarian activities and, where appropriate, early recovery and rehabilitation; and the commitment of the Government of the Sudan at the national and local levels to improve the capacity of its security, judicial and penal institutions to promote and protect human rights.

Indicators

Protection of civilians from imminent threats of physical violence:

- Civilians facing imminent threats of physical violence are protected by UNAMID.
- Civilians at risk of physical attack, in particular women and children, carry out livelihood activities safely and securely under UNAMID protection.
- Civilians receive emergency medical assistance from UNAMID, including through evacuation to medical facilities, in extreme circumstances (i.e., when humanitarian actors are unable to assist).

Protective environment:

- Security and stability (as indicated by an absence of serious crime or violent conflict) for civilians within camps for internally displaced persons and temporary settlements.
- Security and stability (as indicated by an absence of serious crime or violent conflict) for civilians in areas outside of camps for internally displaced persons and temporary settlements, including in particular in areas adjacent to camps.
- Reduction in the number of violent crimes against civilians.
- Reduction in human rights violations, including incidents of sexual and gender-based violence, as recorded by UNAMID.
- Reduction in the use or recruitment of child soldiers by armed groups.
- Trials monitored by UNAMID are fair and in accordance with international legal standards and practices.
- The prevalence of arms and armed actors is reduced through the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants in accordance with the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.
- Threats to civilians posed by unexploded ordnance are addressed through, inter alia, the safe disposal of such materials and through risk awareness training.

Safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access and safety and security for humanitarian personnel:

- Humanitarian actors requesting UNAMID protection and other support are able to conduct operations (e.g., aid delivery and distribution and needs assessments) in a safe, timely and unhindered manner.
- Humanitarian actors and their property are safe and secure, in particular when UNAMID protection is provided.

- Improved environment for the protection of civil and political rights, including through the development of sustainable foundations for professional, democratic policing and law enforcement.
- Parties to the conflict honour their commitments and international obligations to combat all acts of sexual violence against women, men and children and put an end to the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

Benchmark 3: Prevention or mitigation of community conflict through mediation and, in conjunction with the United Nations country team, measures to address its root causes

Requirements for progress would include willingness on the part of the authorities and traditional community leaders to play a constructive role in resolving intercommunal conflict peacefully; the provision of access to UNAMID to facilitate mediation efforts; strengthened traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and greater respect thereof; the inclusion of measures in reconciliation agreements to address the root causes of intercommunal conflict; a willingness on the part of the authorities and other parties to the conflict to fulfil their responsibilities with regard to preventing or resolving intercommunal clashes; and the provision of access to the United Nations country team to enable measures that address root causes related to natural resources, recovery and reconstruction.

Indicators

- Dialogue between pastoralist and agriculturalist communities over peaceful coexistence and shared access to natural resources, in particular prior to and during the migration season.
- Interventions by the authorities and traditional community mediators, facilitated by UNAMID, that prevent or resolve violent intercommunal conflict.
- Dialogue between conflicting parties over local settlements to violent intercommunal conflict.
- Conflicting parties enter into and adhere to local agreements that settle violent intercommunal conflict.
- Reduction in the number of incidents of and new displacement resulting from intercommunal conflict.
- Transitional justice mechanisms, including the National Human Rights Commission, the Special Court for Darfur and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, are established and operating in accordance with international human rights standards and best practices.
- Improved access to justice through the adoption of measures aimed at enhancing victims' rights to truth, justice and remedy.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 1 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Referring to my letter dated 28 February 2014 and upon the instruction of my Government with regard to an act of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, I have the honour to request an urgent open meeting of the Security Council in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council.

I also have the honour to request that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, a representative of the Government of Ukraine be allowed to participate in the meeting and make a statement.

(*Signed*) Yuriy **Sergeyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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